High Command: British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars - Couverture rigide

Elliott, Christopher

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0190233052 ISBN 13 : 9780190233051

Editeur : Oxford University Press, USA, 2015

A propos du livre

Revue de presse :

'Long overdue, High Command is a study of what's wrong at the MoD, and an excellent primer for the Chilcot report. ... Elliott sets out an agenda for reform as well as a narrative. He does so in terms that Evelyn Waugh could not have bettered.' --The Spectator

'Britain will lose more wars unless military chiefs stop agreeing to impossible missions after a decade of errors in Iraq and Afghanistan, a new book warns. . . High Command, based on interviews with many of those at the helm of the military and the Ministry of Defence from the turn of the century, also identifies fundamental flaws inside the ministry that set the conditions for failure. . . Offering a rare insight into the turmoil within the armed forces during one of the most critical decisions of the two wars -- the deployment of British forces to Helmand in 2006 when they were still fighting in southern Iraq.' --Deborah Haynes, Defence Editor, The Times

'It is the responsibility of the chiefs of staff to speak truth to power when Britain goes to war. However, until now they have been accorded little attention in the controversies generated by the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Christopher Elliott has put that right, combining an insider's perspective with shrewdness, wit and strategic insight. If we are to learn lessons from the last decade, this is where to begin.' --Sir Hew Strachan, Chichele Professor of the History of War, University of Oxford

Présentation de l'éditeur :

From 2001, Britain supported the United States in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 'Victory' in such conflicts is always hard to gauge and domestic political backing for them was never robust. For this, the governments of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown were held responsible, and paid the price, but the role played by the High Command in the Ministry of Defence also bears examination. Critics have noted that the armed services were riven by internal rivalry and their leadership was dysfunctional, but the truth is more complicated. In his book, General Elliott explores the circumstances that led to these wars and how the Ministry of Defence coped with the challenges presented. He reveals how the Service Chiefs were set at odds by the system, almost as rivals in the making, with responsibility diffuse and authority ambiguous. The MoD concentrated on making things work, rather than questioning whether what they were being asked to do was practicable. Often the opinion of a junior tactical commander led the entire strategy of the MoD, not the other way around, as it should have been. While Britain's senior officers, defence ministers and civil servants were undeniably competent and well intentioned, the conundrum remains why success on the battlefield proved so elusive.

À propos de cette édition

• Éditeur: Oxford University Press, USA
• Date d'édition: 2015
• ISBN 10: 0190233052
• ISBN 13: 9780190233051
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 286