L'édition de cet ISBN n'est malheureusement plus disponible.
Afficher les exemplaires de cette édition ISBN
Frais de port :
EUR 3,69
Vers Etats-Unis
Description du livre Etat : New. Brand New. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780192898487
Description du livre hardback. Etat : New. Language: ENG. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780192898487
Description du livre Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 42501838-n
Description du livre Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur ABLIING23Feb2215580028955
Description du livre Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 42501838-n
Description du livre Etat : New. Book is in NEW condition. 1.34. N° de réf. du vendeur 0192898485-2-1
Description du livre Etat : New. New! This book is in the same immaculate condition as when it was published 1.34. N° de réf. du vendeur 353-0192898485-new
Description du livre Etat : new. N° de réf. du vendeur 4MQETMZRUK
Description du livre Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9780192898487
Description du livre Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Radical skepticism endorses the extreme claim that large swaths of our ordinary beliefs, such as those produced by perception or memory, are irrational. The best arguments for such skepticism are, in their essentials, as familiar as a popular science fiction movie and yet even seasoned epistemologists continue to find them strangely seductive. Moreover, although most contemporary philosophers dismiss radical skepticism, they cannot agree on how best to respond tothe challenge it presents. In the tradition of the 18th century Scottish philosopher, Thomas Reid, Radical Skepticism and Epistemic Intuition joins this discussion by taking up four main tasks. First, itidentifies the strongest arguments for radical skepticism, namely, underdetermination arguments, which emphasize the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs based on that evidence. Second, it rejects all inferential or argument-based responses to radical skepticism, which aim to lay out good noncircular reasoning from the evidence on which we base our ordinary beliefs to the conclusion that those beliefs are probably true. Third, it develops a commonsense noninferential response toradical skepticism with two distinctive features: (a) it consciously and extensively relies on epistemic intuitions, which are seemings about epistemic goods, such as knowledge and rationality, and (b)it can be endorsed without difficulty by both internalists and externalists in epistemology. Fourth, and finally, it defends this commonsense epistemic-intuition-based response to radical skepticism against a variety of objections, including those connected with underdetermination worries, epistemic circularity, disagreement problems, experimental philosophy, and concerns about whether it engages skepticism in a sufficiently serious way. This book explores the varieties of radical skepticism and different ways of responding to them. It focuses on arguments for radical skepticism that emphasize the gap between our evidence and our ordinary beliefs based on that evidence. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780192898487