Physicalism has over the past 20 years become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the US and Australia show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in acccomodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical works itself is called into question. Both strong "reductionist" versions and weaker "supervenience" theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. The impression with which these essays seek to leave the reader is that the advance of physicalism has been achieved more by talking down the problems that face it than by solving them. This book should be of interest to professional philosophers and students (second-year undergraduate and above) interested in the philosophy of mind.
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Physicalism has in recent years become almost an orthodoxy, especially in the philosophy of mind. Many philosophers, however, feel uneasy about this development, and this volume is intended as a collective response to it. Together these papers, written by philosophers from Britain, the United States, and Australasia, show that physicalism faces enormous problems in every area in which it is discussed. The contributors not only investigate the well-known difficulties that physicalism has in accommodating sensory consciousness, but also bring out its inadequacies in dealing with thought, intentionality, abstract objects (such as numbers), and principles of both theoretical and practical reason; even its ability to cope with the physical world itself is called into question. Both strong 'reductionist' versions and weaker 'supervenience' theories are discussed and found to face different but equally formidable obstacles. These essays suggest forcefully that the advance of physicalism has been achieved more by talking down the problems that it faces than by solving them.
Howard Robinson is Soros Professor of Philosophy at the Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, and Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Liverpool. He is author of Matter and Sense (CUP, 1982) and Perception (Routledge, 1994), editor of George Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge and Three Dialogues in the World's Classics series (OUP 1996), and co-editor of the following volumes: Essays on Berkeley (OUP, 1985), The Pursuit of Mind (Carcanet, 1991), and Aristotle and the Later Tradition (OUP, 1991).
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Hardcover. Etat : Fair. Underlining, binding is sound, cover is firmly attached. N° de réf. du vendeur 1-31-16-2322k-NA
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Hardcover. Etat : Very Good. Etat de la jaquette : Good. 1st Edition. Published by Clarendon Press @ Oxford University Press in 1993, here is the first hardback printing of Objections to Physicalism edited by Howard Robinson. Black cloth binding, gilt spine lettering, 324 pages plus index the book is in very good condition with some light browning throughout. The dust jacket is good with some light creasing and a single chip to the bottom right hand corner at the front. N° de réf. du vendeur 13142
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