The Structure of Regulatory Competition: Corporations and Public Policies in a Global Economy - Couverture rigide

Murphy, Dale D.

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0199267510 ISBN 13 : 9780199267514

Editeur : Oxford University Press, 2004

Synopsis

Book by Murphy Dale D

A propos du livre

Revue de presse :

Review from previous edition The Structure of Regulatory Competition indicates how important the strategies of large corporations are for global and national regulatory policy. Norms and ideas sometimes play a role, but to explain outcomes, Dale Murphy reminds us, we have to understand material interests (Robert O. Keohane, James B. Duke Professor of Political Science, Duke University)

A first-rate contribution to both research and theory on how economic interests affect regulatory policy-making in a global economy. Murphy makes a persuasive case for the critical role played by industry structure in shaping patterns of both international and domestic regulation. This is an important book whose original analysis of the dynamics of both the 'Delaware' and 'California' effects deserves to be widely discussed and debated. (David Vogel, Haas School of Business, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley)

This book represents a major contribution to debates over globalization. Some argue that integration spawns competitions in regulatory laxity. Others maintain that integration encourages upward regulatory harmonization. Murphy transcends this debate, identifying conditions that explain when regulations will drop toward a lowest common denominator, when regulations will converge upward, and when regulatory differences will persist. Murphy presents meticulously researched cases on regulations governing environmental performance, shipping registration and flags-of-convenience, labor standards, and captial adequacy standards. These case studies are theoretically insightful and empirically rich fables of globalization, complete with morals. Essential reading for an era when international trade conflicts center on domestic regulatory differences. (Kenneth A. Oye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology)

Présentation de l'éditeur :

In order to understand international economic regulations, it is essential to understand the variation in competing corporations' interests. Political science theories have neglected the role of individual firms as causal actors. Theories of institutions have neglected to examine the creation of business law. Economic theories have neglected to apply concepts of asset specificity to social regulations in competitive industries. This book aims to fill these voids with a company-based explanation. Its theoretical findings open a 'black box' in the literature on international political economy and elucidate a source of regulatory differences and similarities. Counter-intuitive case studies reveal how business and governments actually interact. They also contribute to both sides of current debates over corporate social responsibility. They examine diverse topics including offshore finance, flags-of-convenience, CFC production, capital requirements, the importation and sale of 'dolphin-lethal' tuna, and the advertising of infant formulae. By exploring powerful corporations' investment profiles and regulatory strategies, this book explains why globalization sometimes results in a 'race to the bottom', sometimes in higher common regulations, and sometimes in regulations that differ between countries. Uniquely, it then explains which regulatory outcome is likely to occur under specified conditions. The explanation incorporates economics, political science, studies of regulatory capture, and examinations of transaction costs, firms' regulatory strategies, and the roles international institutions.

À propos de cette édition

• Éditeur: Oxford University Press
• Date d'édition: 2004
• ISBN 10: 0199267510
• ISBN 13: 9780199267514
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 336