Parliamentary democracy involves a never-ending cycle of elections, government formations, and the need for governments to survive in potentially hostile environments. These conditions require members of any government to make decisions on a large number of issues, some of which sharply divide them. Officials resolve these divisions by 'logrolling'– conceding on issues they care less about, in exchange for reciprocal concessions on issues to which they attach more importance. Though realistically modeling this 'governance cycle' is beyond the scope of traditional formal analysis, this book attacks the problem computationally in two ways. Firstly, it models the behavior of “functionally rational” senior politicians who use informal decision heuristics to navigate their complex high stakes setting. Secondly, by applying computational methods to traditional game theory, it uses artificial intelligence to model how hyper-rational politicians might find strategies that are close to optimal.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Scott de Marchi is Professor of Political Science and Director of Decision Science at Duke University. He is a principal investigator for the for the National Science Foundation's Empirical Implications of Theoretical Models program and his research focuses on decision-making in contexts that include Congress, coalition and crisis bargaining, and interstate conflict.
Michael Laver is Emeritus Professor of Politics at New York University. He has published 20 books including Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe (1991), Making and Breaking Governments (1996), and Party Competition: An Agent-Based Model (2014).
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
EUR 12,49 expédition depuis Etats-Unis vers France
Destinations, frais et délaisEUR 5,89 expédition depuis Royaume-Uni vers France
Destinations, frais et délaisVendeur : Books From California, Simi Valley, CA, Etats-Unis
paperback. Etat : Good. Cover and edges may have some wear. N° de réf. du vendeur mon0003722820
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : THE SAINT BOOKSTORE, Southport, Royaume-Uni
Paperback / softback. Etat : New. This item is printed on demand. New copy - Usually dispatched within 5-9 working days 350. N° de réf. du vendeur C9781009315487
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9781009315487_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 200 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.52 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. N° de réf. du vendeur __100931548X
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9781009315487
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : BargainBookStores, Grand Rapids, MI, Etats-Unis
Paperback or Softback. Etat : New. The Governance Cycle in Parliamentary Democracies 0.75. Book. N° de réf. du vendeur BBS-9781009315487
Quantité disponible : 5 disponible(s)
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Über den AutorScott de Marchi is Professor of Political Science and Director of Decision Science at Duke University. He is a principal investigator for the for the National Science Foundation s Empirical Implications of Theoretical . N° de réf. du vendeur 723233262
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 44866592-n
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPricesUK, Woodford Green, Royaume-Uni
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur 44866592-n
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : GreatBookPrices, Columbia, MD, Etats-Unis
Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition. N° de réf. du vendeur 44866592
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles