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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems With Strategic Agents: An Implementation Theory Approach - Couverture rigide
Synopsis
This thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems. Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents' utilities. Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process. Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis. The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field.
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À propos de l?auteur
Ali Kakhbod completed his PhD at the University of Michigan.
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents : An Implementation Theory Approach
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Springer New York, 2013
ISBN 10 : 1461463181
ISBN 13 : 9781461463184
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents. An Implementation Theory Approach.
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ISBN 10 : 1461463181
ISBN 13 : 9781461463184
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XVII, 88 p. Hardcover. Versand aus Deutschland / We dispatch from Germany via Air Mail. Einband bestoßen, daher Mängelexemplar gestempelt, sonst sehr guter Zustand. Imperfect copy due to slightly bumped cover, apart from this in very good condition. Stamped. Springer Theses, Recognizing Outstanding Ph.D. Research. Sprache: Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 32817AB
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents
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ISBN 10 : 1461463181
ISBN 13 : 9781461463184
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Nominated as an outstanding thesis by the University of MichiganThe thesis focuses on unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networksIncludes power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-ch. N° de réf. du vendeur 4199035
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents
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ISBN 10 : 1461463181
ISBN 13 : 9781461463184
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Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -This thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems. Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents' utilities. Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process. Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis. The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field. 108 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781461463184
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems With Strategic Agents : An Implementation Theory Approach
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents: An Implementation Theory Approach (Springer Theses)
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents : An Implementation Theory Approach
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Springer New York, Springer New York, 2013
ISBN 10 : 1461463181
ISBN 13 : 9781461463184
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Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - This thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems. Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents' utilities. Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process. Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis. The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781461463184
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents
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Springer New York, Springer New York Jan 2013, 2013
ISBN 10 : 1461463181
ISBN 13 : 9781461463184
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Allemagne
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Buch. Etat : Neu. Neuware -This thesis presents a significant contribution to decentralized resource allocation problems with strategic agents. The study focused on three classes of problems arising in communication networks. (C1). Unicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C2). Multi-rate multicast service provisioning in wired networks. (C3). Power allocation and spectrum sharing in multi-user multi-channel wireless communication systems. Problems in (C1) are market problems; problems in (C2) are a combination of markets and public goods; problems in (C3) are public goods. Dr. Kakhbod developed game forms/mechanisms for unicast and multi-rate multicast service provisioning that possess specific properties. First, the allocations corresponding to all Nash equilibria (NE) of the games induced by the mechanisms are optimal solutions of the corresponding centralized allocation problems, where the objective is the maximization of the sum of the agents' utilities. Second, the strategic agents voluntarily participate in the allocation process. Third, the budget is balanced at the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism as well as at all other feasible allocations. For the power allocation and spectrum sharing problem, he developed a game form that possesses the second and third properties as detailed above along with a fourth property: the allocations corresponding to all NE of the game induced by the mechanism are Pareto optimal. The thesis contributes to the state of the art of mechanism design theory. In particular, designing efficient mechanisms for the class of problems that are a combination of markets and public goods, for the first time, have been addressed in this thesis. The exposition, although highly rigorous and technical, is elegant and insightful which makes this thesis work easily accessible to those just entering this field and will also be much appreciated by experts in the field.Springer Verlag GmbH, Tiergartenstr. 17, 69121 Heidelberg 108 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9781461463184
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems With Strategic Agents : An Implementation Theory Approach
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Resource Allocation in Decentralized Systems with Strategic Agents: An Implementation Theory Approach
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ISBN 10 : 1461463181
ISBN 13 : 9781461463184
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