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The 1973 Arab-Israeli War: The Albatross of Decisive Victory (Levenworth Papers, 21) - Couverture souple
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· . The dazzling victory in the '67 war. ... contributed to the building of a myth around the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] and its personnel. The common expectations from the 1DF were that any future war would be short with few casualties. — Major General Avraharn Adan, Israeli division commander, 19731 The standard for America's Army must be "decisive victory." — General Gordon Sullivan, U.S. Army Chief of Staff, 19922 Achieving a decisive victory in a short period with relatively few casualties stands as a desirable goal for modern armies in conventional war. The Six Day War of 5-10 June 1967 saw the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) achieve such a military triumph over the combined Arab armies of Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. As a result of this remarkable achievement, Israel emerged as the superpower in the Middle East, seemingly invincible in conducting maneuver warfare against any Arab coalition. Conventional wisdom, therefore, would counsel against challenging such a militarily superior foe in a major war. But Egypt and Syria subsequently risked just that by attacking Israel on 6 October 1973, less than seven years after their debacle. Acutely aware of the unfavorable odds, Egypt's President Anwar Sadat resorted to a war strategy designed to achieve political success without a military victory. There is an important lesson here about the limits of military power. Israel's impressive battlefield accomplishment in 1967 had failed to bring peace with any Arab state. In fact, the Arabs' resolve was strengthened by the humiliation of their decisive defeat. Meanwhile, the dramatic military victory unconsciously created an albatross for the IDF. In particular, the stellar military performance in 1967 spawned an unrealistic standard of excellence virtually impossible for the IDF to duplicate in its next armed conflict. Furthermore, the Israelis expected the Arabs to perform in the next war as poorly as they did in 1967. Rather than discern these two expectations as a recipe for disaster, the Israeli military unconsciously fell into the trap of preparing to fight its next war as it had waged its last conflict. And this it did in a spirit of over confidence. In response, the Egyptians, led by Anwar Sadat, exploited Israel's strategic mindset through a judicious and fortuitous combination of war and diplomacy. The shock and lethality of the 1973 war, coupled with Sadat's adroit statesmanship and America's determined mediation, led to a change in Israeli attitudes and policy. Eventually, a new Israeli government signed a peace treaty
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- ÉditeurCreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform
- Date d'édition2011
- ISBN 10 1469971186
- ISBN 13 9781469971186
- ReliurePaperback
- Nombre de pages104
- Evaluation vendeur
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