9781939240057 (1 résultats)

Three Ring Binder. Etat : Good. Etat de la jaquette : No DJ present. Xerox-type reproduction. 141, [1] pages. Notes. Figures. List of Acronyms and Key Terms. Annex. Copied on both sides of the sheet. Some pages blank in the original. Pagination appears complete. Pages have been three-hole punched twice. Michael Krepon co-founded the Stimson Center in 1989. He served as Stimson's President and CEO until 2000, and continues to direct Stimson's programming on nuclear and space issues. He was the University of Virginia's Diplomat Scholar, where he taught from 2001-2010. He is the author and editor of twenty-one books. He worked at the Carnegie Endowment, the State Department's Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and on Capitol Hill. He received the Carnegie Endowment's Thérèse Delpech Memorial Award in 2015 for lifetime achievement in non-governmental work to reduce nuclear dangers. Christopher Oren Clary's research focuses on the sources of cooperation in interstate rivalries. he also studies the causes and consequences of nuclear proliferation, U.S. defense policy, and the politics of South Asia. Previously, He served as country director for South Asian affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense (2006-2009), a research associate at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, Calif. (2003-2005), and a research assistant at the Henry L. Stimson Center in Washington, D.C. (2001-2003). I received a Ph.D. in Political Science from MIT. US national security experts spend years studying, seeking to avoid and sometimes helping to mediate or prosecute conflicts. Over time, veteran policy hands in the executive and legislative branches, as well as academia, thinks tanks and the media, come to believe that they understand all the important dimensions of security. And yet, for most, one dimension - space - presents a significant gap in their understanding. Space's importance is major, growing and underappreciated inside the Washington Beltway. Over a half century ago, the US-Soviet space race captured the imagination of the American people, and the manned space program from the 1960s onward bred national competence in the design, manufacture and launch of rockets, satellites and payloads with ever-greater capabilities. Scientific study, helped by access to space, fourished. Civil and military use of space-based communications grew fast as the internet, personal computing and cellular telephony gained widespread adoption beginning in the 1990s. By the end of the decade, the Pentagon recognized that the US military had developed a dependence on spaced-based communications, such that a sudden denial of space-enabled information in wartime could impair the effectiveness of combat units. The military saw from wargaming simulations of future conflict that space assets were like a crystal goblet: exquisite but easily shattered. An adversary would naturally contemplate measures to disable US forces' ability to command and control operations across an entire theater of operations, and to access real-time intelligence and targeting data supplied from distant sources. e enormous warfighting advantage afforded to US forces by space systems was, because of its vulnerability, perceived as an Achilles heel. The conclusion was logical: space had to be defended. Space became a "domain," talked about by defense analysts as one of several discrete arenas of potential confrontation, like air, land, sea or nuclear - or more recently, cyber. For security experts, these can be useful categories; yet here is where the underappreciation of space becomes acute. It is not just that traditional "terrestrial" warfare, involving loss of life, destruction of property and territorial conquest imposes readily-visible costs that society has long recognized as vital interests, while the idea of attacking satellites in space seems a lesser level of aggression. e deeper problem is with the long-term consequences of destructive conflict in space, for these may be poorly anticipated by policymakers during a time of hostilities, and yet, in retrospect, these may prove to be more regrettable than all but the most destructive acts of war in the other "domains." A kinetic-energy ASAT test conducted in 2007 by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) ended complacency over the hazards of space debris. is ASAT test produced more latent capabilities to engage in space warfare have grown, and have become more prominent than 3,000 pieces of debris large enough to track, and tens of thousands of smaller pieces, endangering human spaceflight and hundreds of satellites, without regard for ownership and nationality. The Pentagon demonstrated an agile, sea-based ASAT capability in 2008 by shooting down a non-functioning intelligence satellite, in a manner that minimized debris consequences. As a result of these tests, as well as other significant debris-causing events, recognition of the potential environmental consequences of space warfare is unquestionably greater now than during the Cold War. Reaction to the PLA's 2007 ASAT did not spark mass protests, unlike the case of atmospheric testing. This ASAT test did, however, alarm space operators to such an extent that an international norm against further tests of this kind might take hold.