The four volumes Game Equilibrium Models contain the results of an interdisciplinary research group on non-cooperative game theory. Volume II is mainly of interest for economists.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. The four volumes of "Game Equilibrium Models" present applications of non-cooperative game theory. Problems of strategic interaction arising in biology, economics, political science and the social sciences in general are treated in 42 papers on a wide variety of subjects. Internationally known authors with backgrounds in various disciplines have contributed original research and aim to provide innovative modelling combined with advanced methods of analysis. The four volumes are the outcome of a research year at the Center for Interdisciplinary Studies of the University of Bielefeld. The close interaction of an international interdisciplinary group of researchers has produced a collection of results of interest to the reader who wants to be informed on the scope, potential, and future direction of work in applied game theory. This volume contains areas of research which may attract the interest of economists, political scientists, mathematicians and philosophers. The papers deal with the methodology of analysis of games, game theoretic contributions to fundamental ethical questions facing societies and game-theoretic analyses of market environments. The four volumes of "Game Equilibrium Models" present applications of non-cooperative game theory. This volume considers the methodology of analysis of games, game theoretic contributions to fundamental ethical questions facing societies and game-theoretic analysis of market environments. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783540542261
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Buch. Etat : Neu. Neuware - This paper represents the collaborative work of a game theorist and a policy analyst in an attempt to examine severa! questions that go to the hearl of the way individuala achieve social order. The capacity of any individual to undertake long-term, productive activities that affect and are affected by the actiona of other individuala dependa upon gaining a minimallevel of predictability among those involved. No one could successfully drive to work if the behavior of other drivera were noi relatively predictable. No one could operate a stare, if potential consumers did not purcha. se, rather than stea!, the commodities offered to the public. No one would ma. ke a. ny investments other than those tha. t would be made by a solitary individual in an isolated setting (the cla. ssic Robinson Crusoe situation). One of the ways that individuals achieve predictability in social arrangements is to a. gree to follow a set of normative prescriptions a. bout what they must, must not, or may do. Agreeing to a set of prescriptions is relatively easy. Actually following those prescriptions over time when temptations arise offering potentially high payoffs, is not at all easy. In natural settings, individUala follow agreed upon prescriptions to a greater or lesser extent depending on enforcement levels. A frequent assumption made by policy ana. lysts a. nd game theorists is tha. t enforcement is externa! to the situa. tion under analysis. That a. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783540542261
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