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Synopsis
How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and economic development? This question cannot be answered from a purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book, we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the distribution of political power among four different kinds of agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and “grabbers,” which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria, the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the characteristics of the communication network that connects the citizens.
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Présentation de l'éditeur
How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and economic development? This question cannot be answered from a purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book, we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the distribution of political power among four different kinds of agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and “grabbers,” which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria, the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the characteristics of the communication network that connects the citizens.
Biographie de l'auteur
Wilson Perez-Oviedo received a B.Sc. in Mathematics from the National Polytechnic University and a Master’s Degree in Economics from FLACSO, both in Quito. In 2006 he received his Ph.D. in Economics from Cornell University, being his advisor Dr. Kaushik Basu. Currently, Wilson teaches economics and mathematics at USFQ and FLACSO, Quito, Ecuador.
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Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment : A Game Theory Approach
Edité par
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2012
ISBN 10 : 3847306081
ISBN 13 : 9783847306085
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Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment
Edité par
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2012
ISBN 10 : 3847306081
ISBN 13 : 9783847306085
Neuf
Couverture souple
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Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment : A Game Theory Approach
Edité par
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing, 2012
ISBN 10 : 3847306081
ISBN 13 : 9783847306085
Neuf
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Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. nach der Bestellung gedruckt Neuware - Printed after ordering - How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and economic development This question cannot be answered from a purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book, we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the distribution of political power among four different kinds of agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and grabbers, which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria, the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the characteristics of the communication network that connects the citizens. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783847306085
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Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment
Edité par
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Apr 2012, 2012
ISBN 10 : 3847306081
ISBN 13 : 9783847306085
Neuf
Taschenbuch
Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne
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Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and economic development This question cannot be answered from a purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book, we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the distribution of political power among four different kinds of agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and grabbers, which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria, the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the characteristics of the communication network that connects the citizens. 92 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783847306085
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
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Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment
Edité par
LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing Apr 2012, 2012
ISBN 10 : 3847306081
ISBN 13 : 9783847306085
Neuf
Taschenbuch
Vendeur : buchversandmimpf2000, Emtmannsberg, BAYE, Allemagne
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Neuware -How should a country change its institutions to achieve social and economic development This question cannot be answered from a purely economic view; instead, it must be understood within a wider perspective where institutional change requires affecting the whole political-economic system. To address these issues, in this book, we develop a simple model to explain how multiple institutional equilibria could arise in a small open economy, studying how the distribution of political power among four different kinds of agents (capitalists, skilled workers, unskilled workers and ¿grabbers,¿ which are rent-seeking elites, endemic in many underdeveloped countries) could generate either a productive or a rent-seeking equilibrium. As the distribution of political power in a society is so crucial to understanding institutional equilibria, the second part of the book is dedicated to apply the concept of networks to explain this distribution. For that, a game theoretic model is formulated in which both the occurrence and success of an uprising by the citizens against a dictator depend on the characteristics of the communication network that connects the citizens.Books on Demand GmbH, Überseering 33, 22297 Hamburg 92 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9783847306085
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)