The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law

Robert E. Scott

ISBN 10: 0521367972 / ISBN 13: 9780521367974

Edité par Cambridge University Press 2011-07-14, 2011

A propos de cet article

N° de réf. du vendeur 6666-IUK-9780521367974

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: The Limits of Leviathan: Contract Theory and the Enforcement of International Law
• Éditeur: Cambridge University Press 2011-07-14
• Date de parution: 2011
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 0521367972
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9780521367974
• Reliure: Paperback
• État de l'article: New

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

Originally published in 2006, The Limits of Leviathan documents the emergence of hard international law.

Revue de presse

Review of the hardback: 'Professors Scott and Stephan have produced an important and thought-provoking book on the intersection of contract theory and international law. The authors contend that there is too much enforcement of international law by private parties who file complaints before international tribunals and domestic courts armed with the power to sanction nations that fail to live up to their treaty bargains. This is a provocative claim, one that challenges the widely-held views of international lawyers and political scientists that the international legal system is weak and needs to be strengthened. The authors support their theory of optimal enforcement of international agreements with numerous examples ranging across human rights, trade, international criminal law, and intellectual property. And they include specific prescriptions for governments and policymakers. Scholars of international cooperation and treaty design would do well to give The Limits of Leviathan the careful attention that it deserves.' Laurence R. Helfer, Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School

Review of the hardback: 'The Limits of Leviathan is an original and an important book. It is the first use of modern contract theory to explain and to improve the relation between formal and informal enforcement of treaties and other international agreements. Much international law rests on these consensual arrangements, and contract theory is meant to explain consensual arrangements. The book's lucid explanations and critiques of existing practice thus will be very helpful to international lawyers, and they will also extend the reach of contract theory itself.' Alan Schwartz, Sterling Professor of Law, Yale Law School

Review of the hardback: 'One of the most significant developments in international law in the past decades has been the rise of institutionalized international tribunals - like the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms, various EU courts, and the International Criminal Court - that can enforce international law against states. The Limits of Leviathan employs economic theories of contract formation and enforcement to explain the rise and operation of these institutions. Scott and Stephan show how a combination of formal institutional sanctions and more traditional informal sanctioning methods (such as retaliation and reputational loss) work together to foster cooperation among nations. They also provide a framework for explaining how institutionalized enforcement can go too far and retard cooperation among nations. The Limits of Leviathan is a realistic, hard-nosed examination of the promise and perils of international enforcement institutions, and an important contribution to the burgeoning use of social science methodologies to explain international relations.' Jack L. Goldsmith, Henry L. Shattuck Professor of Law, Harvard Law School