Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge, Vol. 2 of 2 (Classic Reprint)

Bernard Bosanquet

ISBN 10: 1330355652 / ISBN 13: 9781330355657

Edité par Forgotten Books, 2018

A propos de cet article

Used - Like New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

N° de réf. du vendeur P1-9781330355657

Détails bibliographiques

• Titre: Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge, Vol. 2 of 2 (Classic Reprint)
• Éditeur: Forgotten Books
• Date de parution: 2018
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN à 10 chiffres: 1330355652
• ISBN à 13 chiffres: 9781330355657
• Reliure: PAP
• État de l'article: Used - Very Good

A propos de ce titre

Synopsis

Excerpt from Logic or the Morphology of Knowledge

And of course it might be correlatively maintained that facts are not data, except by virtue of a result; or if this is not true of data but only of premises, then that inference does not start from data but only from premises 1. At first sight such a contention seems to blink the difficulty. The conclusion, it seems, may be removed by a week's work from the data or premises; and granting that they are not rightly called data or premises till the week's end when the conclusion is won, still the facts concerned were present and active at the beginning of the week and certainly entered into the advance that has been made.

Présentation de l'éditeur

Of Inference CHAPTER I The Nature of Inference i. Inference shares the essence of Judgment, but, at The least qua explicit Inference, has in addition a differentia of oinferits own. The essence of Judgment is the reference of an ideal ence content to Reality; the differentia of Inference affects the mode of this reference, and consists in Mediation. Inference then is the mediate reference of an ideal content to Reality. If I affirm that I spoke to you in the street yesterday simply because I find it in my memory that I did so speak to you, that is, apart from refinements of analysis, simply a judgment. If, as against your denial of the fact, I corroborate my recollection by pointing out that I must have spoken to you, because you afterwards acted upon something that I then told you, then I am reasserting the content of my original judgment, but with an addition and modification that turns it into an Inference. I then refer an ideal content to Reality, not as directly given in memory or in perception, but on the strength of a content, distinguishable from the former content, bearing a certain relation to it, and itself referred directly to reality. By speaking of mediate reference to reality we have mentioned the differentia of Inference, but have not explained it. Direct affirmation appears to explain itself; but mediate affirmation is even at first sight somewhat mysterious. We are at once met with the old question, How are synthetic judgments a priori possible. The qualification a priori adds nothing to the qualification true which is claimed by all judgment as such. Forgotten Books is a publisher of historical writings, such as: Philosophy, Classics, Science, Religion, History, Folklore and Mythology.