tm scanlon (27 résultats)

Etat : Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. Clean from markings. With owner's name inside cover. In good all round condition.

Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. Demands for greater equality can seem puzzling, because it can be unclear what reason people have for objecting to the difference between what they have and what others have, as opposed simply to wanting to be better off. This book examines six such reasons. Inequality can be objectionable because it arises from a failure of some agent to give equal concern tothe interests of different parties to whom it is obligated to provide some good. It can be objectionable because it involves or gives rise to objectionable inequalities in status. It can beobjectionable because it gives the rich unacceptable forms of control over the lives of those who have less. It can be objectionable because it interferes with the procedural fairness of economic institutions, or because it deprives some people of substantive opportunity to take part in those institutions. Inequality can be objectionable because it interferes with the fairness of political institutions. Finally, inequality in wealth and income can be objectionable because it is unfair: theinstitutional mechanisms that produce it cannot be justified in the relevant way. Scanlon's aims is to provide a moral anatomy of these six reasons, and the ideas of equality that they involve. He alsoexamines objections to the pursuit of equality on the ground that it involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and argues that ideas of desert do not provide a basis either for justifying significant economic inequality or for objecting to it. Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. He considers the nature and importance of equality of opportunity, whether the pursuit of greater equality involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and whether the rich can be said to deserve their greater rewards. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Trade Paperback. 1st Edition. Near Fine condition - an as new copy. Robust, professional packaging and tracking provided for all parcels. 273 pages. These essays in political philosophy by T. M. Scanlon, written between 1969 and 1999, examine the standards by which social and political institutions should be justified and appraised.

Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief.Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflectiveequilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense ofnormative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers aninterpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium. Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Etat : NEW.

Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable: T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. Demands for greater equality can seem puzzling, because it can be unclear what reason people have for objecting to the difference between what they have and what others have, as opposed simply to wanting to be better off. This book examines six such reasons. Inequality can be objectionable because it arises from a failure of some agent to give equal concern to the interests of different parties to whom it is obligated to provide some good. It can be objectionable because it involves or gives rise to objectionable inequalities in status. It can be objectionable because it gives the rich unacceptable forms of control over the lives of those who have less. It can be objectionable because it interferes with the procedural fairness of economic institutions, or because it deprives some people of substantive opportunity to take part in those institutions. Inequality can be objectionable because it interferes with the fairness of political institutions. Finally, inequality in wealth and income can be objectionable because it is unfair: the institutional mechanisms that produce it cannot be justified in the relevant way. Scanlon's aim is to provide a moral anatomy of these six reasons, and the ideas of equality that they involve. He also examines objections to the pursuit of equality on the ground that it involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and argues that ideas of desert do not provide a basis either for justifying significant economic inequality or for objecting to it. Inequality is widely regarded as morally objectionable; T. M. Scanlon investigates why it matters to us. He considers the nature and importance of equality of opportunity, whether the pursuit of greater equality involves objectionable interference with individual liberty, and whether the rich can be said to deserve their greater rewards. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Brossura. Etat : nuovo. Etat de la jaquette : nuovo. prima edizione. DISPONIBILITÀ GARANTITA AL 99%; SPEDIZIONE ENTRO 12 ORE DALL'ORDINE. RIMANENZA DI MAGAZZINO PARI AL NUOVO. ANCORA NEL CELLOPHANE EDITORIALE. RARO. Atti del Convegno tenuto a Napoli il 15-16 giugno 1988. Indice Avvertenza di Sebastiano Maffettone Libera ragione pubblica e equilibrio riflessivo; Sebastiano Maffettone Sull'idea di libera ragione pubblica; John Rawls Fondamenti filosofici per la neutralità liberale; Ronald Dworkin Cosa rende utopica una teoria politica; Thomas Nagel Il liberalismo e il valore della scelta; T.M. Scanlon Indice dei nomi. Descrizione bibliografica Titolo: L'idea di giustizia: la filosofia politica americana contemporanea Autore: AA.VV. (Autori Vari) Curatore: Sebastiano Maffettone Traduzione di: Giampaolo Ferranti Editore: Napoli: Guida Editori, 1993 Lunghezza: 122 pagine; 22 cm ISBN: 8878352152, 9788878352155 Collana: Volume 14 di Laboratorio. Pubblicazioni dell'Istituto Suor Orsola Benincasa Soggetti: Giustizia, Concetto, Sistema politico americano, Stati Uniti d'America, Diritto, Legge, Filosofia politica, Potere giudiziario, Teoria generale, Sistemi giuridici, Studi culturali, Scienza politica, Liberalismo, Comunitarismo, Multiculturalismo, Costituzionalismo, Democrazia, Seminari, Congressi, Governo, Utopismo, Philosophie politique, États-Unis, Congrès, Cohen, John Rawls, Just society, Morale, Etica, Anni Settanta, Consenso, Individui, Società, Uguaglianza, Positivismo giuridico, Luck egalitarianism, Fondamenti, Principi, Leggi, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Immanuel Kant, Contrattualismo, Tolleranza, Egualitarismo, Dibattito Anglo-Americano, Neutralismo, Waldron, Ackerman, Cittadinanza, Diritti civili, Lezioni, Libertà, Teoria liberale, Illuminismo, Saggi, Libri Vintage fuori catalogo, Justice, Concept, American Political System, United States of America, Law, Political Philosophy, Judiciary, General Theory, Legal Systems, Cultural Studies, Political Science, Liberalism, Communitarianism, Multiculturalism, Constitutionalism, Democracy, Seminars, Congresses, Government, Utopism, Moral, Ethics, The Seventies, Consent, Individuals, Society, Equality, Legal Positivism, Foundations, Principles, Laws, Contractualism, Tolerance, Egalitarianism, Anglo-American Debate, Neutralism, Citizenship, Civil Rights, Lessons, Freedom, Liberal theory, Enlightenment, Essays, Out of print Books.

Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. T. M. Scanlon offers a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are irreducibly normative truths about reasons for action. He responds to three familiar objections: that such truths would have troubling metaphysical implications; that we would have no way of knowing what they are; and that the role of reasons in motivating and explaining action could not be explained if accepting a conclusion about reasons for action were a kind of belief.Scanlon answers the first of these objections within a general account of ontological commitment, applying to mathematics as well as normative judgments. He argues that the method of reflectiveequilibrium, properly understood, provides an adequate account of how we come to know both normative truths and mathematical truths, and that the idea of a rational agent explains the link between an agent's normative beliefs and his or her actions. Whether every statement about reasons for action has a determinate truth value is a question to be answered by an overall account of reasons for action, in normative terms. Since it seems unlikely that there is such an account, the defense ofnormative cognitivism offered here is qualified: statements about reasons for action can have determinate truth values, but it is not clear that all of them do. Along the way, Scanlon offers aninterpretation of the distinction between normative and non-normative claims, a new account of the supervenience of the normative on the non-normative, an interpretation of the idea of the relative strength of reasons, and a defense of the method of reflective equilibrium. Is what we have reason to do a matter of fact? If so, what kind of truth is involved, how can we know it, and how do reasons motivate and explain action? In this concise and lucid book T. M. Scanlon offers answers, with a qualified defense of normative cognitivism--the view that there are normative truths about reasons for action. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability.

Etat : MUY BUEN ESTADO. 1ª edición. RÚSTICA CON SOLAPAS 500 gramos 478 PAGS. LIBRO NUEVO SIN USAR CON PORTADA Y CONTRAPORTADA LIGERAMENTE AMARILLEADAS POR EL TIEMPO EN SUS PARTES SUPERIOR E INFERIOR CUBIERTA LIGERAMENTE AMARILLEADA POR EL PASO DEL TIEMPO. LIBRO.

Etat : Fine. Number of pages: ix. 420 p. Size: 24 cm.

Couverture souple. Etat : bon. RO60152537: 1998. In-8. Broché. Bon état, Couv. convenable, Dos satisfaisant, Papier jauni. 42p ages. Texte en anglais. Quelques rousseurs. Jaquette correcte. Annotation au marqueur en tranche en pied. Avec Jaquette. . . Classification Dewey : 420-Langue anglaise. Anglo-saxon.