what owe de scanlon (50 résultats)

PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Etat : NEW.

PAP. Etat : New. New Book. Shipped from UK. Established seller since 2000.

Etat : New. In.

Etat : New. 2000. Revised. Paperback. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? This text offers answers to these questions, and explores the views and values behind them. Num Pages: 432 pages. BIC Classification: HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 234 x 158 x 27. Weight in Grams: 492. . . . . .

Paperback or Softback. Etat : New. What We Owe to Each Other 1.4. Book.

Etat : New.

Softcover. Etat : Good. This magnificent bookopens up a novel, arresting position on matters that have been debated for thousands of years. -Times Literary SupplementHow do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong.

Etat : new.

Paperback / softback. Etat : New. New copy - Usually dispatched within 4 working days. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? This text offers answers to these questions, and explores the views and values behind them.

Etat : New.

Etat : New. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as.

Etat : Fair. Buy with confidence! Book is in acceptable condition with wear to the pages, binding, and some marks within 1.37.

Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 432 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Neuware - According to T. M. Scanlon's contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he demonstrates how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.

Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Etat : New. 2000. Revised. Paperback. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? This text offers answers to these questions, and explores the views and values behind them. Num Pages: 432 pages. BIC Classification: HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly; (UU) Undergraduate. Dimension: 234 x 158 x 27. Weight in Grams: 492. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland.

Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 432 pages. 9.25x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock.

Etat : New. Buy with confidence! Book is in new, never-used condition 1.37.

Softcover. Etat : New. This magnificent bookopens up a novel, arresting position on matters that have been debated for thousands of years. -Times Literary SupplementHow do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong.

Etat : New.

Etat : Very Good. Book is in Used-VeryGood condition. Pages and cover are clean and intact. Used items may not include supplementary materials such as CDs or access codes. May show signs of minor shelf wear and contain very limited notes and highlighting. 1.37.

Soft cover. Etat : Near Fine. Third printing, 2000. Trade paperback. 8vo. (ix)420pp. Minimal light signs of prior handling.

Etat : As New. Unread book in perfect condition.

Soft Cover. Etat : new.

Etat : Good. Good condition. This is the average used book, that has all pages or leaves present, but may include writing. Book may be ex-library with stamps and stickers. 1.37.

Etat : good. 100% Customer Satisfaction Guaranteed ! The book shows some signs of wear from use but is a good readable copy. Cover in excellent condition. Binding tight. Pages in great shape, no tears. Not contain access codes, cd, DVD.

paperback. Etat : New. Brand New!.

Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability.

Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not to do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? In this book, T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. According to his contractualist view, thinking about right and wrong is thinking about what we do in terms that could be justified to others and that they could not reasonably reject. He shows how the special authority of conclusions about right and wrong arises from the value of being related to others in this way, and he shows how familiar moral ideas such as fairness and responsibility can be understood through their role in this process of mutual justification and criticism.Scanlon bases his contractualism on a broader account of reasons, value, and individual well-being that challenges standard views about these crucial notions. He argues that desires do not provide us with reasons, that states of affairs are not the primary bearers of value, and that well-being is not as important for rational decision-making as it is commonly held to be. Scanlon is a pluralist about both moral and non-moral values. He argues that, taking this plurality of values into account, contractualism allows for most of the variability in moral requirements that relativists have claimed, while still accounting for the full force of our judgments of right and wrong. How do we judge whether an action is morally right or wrong? If an action is wrong, what reason does that give us not do it? Why should we give such reasons priority over our other concerns and values? T. M. Scanlon offers new answers to these questions, as they apply to the central part of morality that concerns what we owe to each other. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability.