This book examines deterrence theory, using a multidisciplinary approach to look for evidence of its validity. The contributors aim to understand the conditions under which a strong threat of punishment produces either restraint in an adversary or leads to undesired military escalation, as it seems to have done in some international crises in the past. It looks at qualitative and quantitative studies of international military crises and game theoretical models. It also considers indirect evidence from the study of international trade conflicts, revolutions, interpersonal conflict and small market competition. It concludes that deterrence theory is neither valid nor invalid and that it is more productive to look for conditional statements about when the theory holds true.
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Vendeur : Half Price Books Inc., Dallas, TX, Etats-Unis
paperback. Etat : Very Good. Connecting readers with great books since 1972! Used books may not include companion materials, and may have some shelf wear or limited writing. We ship orders daily and Customer Service is our top priority! N° de réf. du vendeur S_444262298
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Vendeur : Boobooks, ARMIDALE, NSW, Australie
Paperback. Examining deterrence theory through a multidisciplinary search for evidence on its validity, this collection of essays explore the conditions under which a strong threat of punishment produces restraint in an adversary, as classic deterrence theory predicts, or else leads to undesired military escalation. Contributors include Richard Ned Lebow, George H. Quester, Paul W. Schroeder, Michael G. Fry, Jack S. Levy, Barry O'Neill, Robert Wilson, John A. C. Conybeare, David B. Yoffie, Jack A. Goldstone, Harold Kelly and Greg Schmidt, and Dean G. Pruitt. Good condition. Many small dotted stains on edges. N° de réf. du vendeur 24593943
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