The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution - Couverture rigide

Matthews, Robert J.

 
9780199211258: The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and Their Attribution
Couverture rigide
ISBN 10 : 0199211256 ISBN 13 : 9780199211258
Editeur : Oxford University Press, 2007

Synopsis

The Measure of Mind provides a sustained critique of a widely held representationalist view of propositional attitudes and their role in the production of thought and behaviour. On this view, having a propositional attitude is a matter of having an explicit representation that plays a particular causal/computational role in the production of thought and behaviour. Robert J. Matthews argues that this view does not enjoy the theoretical or the empirical support that proponents claim for it; moreover, the view misconstrues the role of propositional attitude attributions in cognitive scientific theorizing.

The Measure of Mind goes on to develop an alternative measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and the sentences by which we attribute them. On this account, the sentences by which we attribute propositional attitudes function semantically like the sentences by which we attribute a quantity of some physical magnitude (e.g., having a mass of 80 kilos). That is, in much the same way that we specify a quantity of some physical magnitude by means of its numerical representative on a measurement scale, we specify propositional attitude of a given type by means of its representative in a linguistically-defined measurement space. Propositional attitudes turn out to be causally efficacious aptitudes for thought and behaviour, not semantically evaluable mental particulars of some sort. Matthews' measurement-theoretic account provides a more plausible view of the explanatorily relevant properties of propositional attitudes, the semantics of propositional attitude attributions, and the role of such attributions in computational cognitive scientific theorizing.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

The Measure of Mind provides a sustained critique of a widely held representationalist view of propositional attitudes and their role in the production of thought and behaviour. On this view, having a propositional attitude is a matter of having an explicit representation that plays a particular causal/computational role in the production of thought and behaviour. Robert J. Matthews argues that this view does not enjoy the theoretical or the empirical support that proponents claim for it; moreover, the view misconstrues the role of propositional attitude attributions in cognitive scientific theorizing. The Measure of Mind goes on to develop an alternative measurement-theoretic account of propositional attitudes and the sentences by which we attribute them. On this account, the sentences by which we attribute propositional attitudes function semantically like the sentences by which we attribute a quantity of some physical magnitude (e.g., having a mass of 80 kilos). That is, in much the same way that we specify a quantity of some physical magnitude by means of its numerical representative on a measurement scale, we specify propositional attitude of a given type by means of its representative in a linguistically-defined measurement space. Propositional attitudes turn out to be causally efficacious aptitudes for thought and behaviour, not semantically evaluable mental particulars of some sort. Matthews' measurement-theoretic account provides a more plausible view of the explanatorily relevant properties of propositional attitudes, the semantics of propositional attitude attributions, and the role of such attributions in computational cognitive scientific theorizing.

Revue de presse

fascinating book...Robert Matthews pursues, with great rigour and tenacity, the question of how we should understand our practice of attributing propositional attitudes and, in particular, the specific questions of how subjects must be built (given the best available accounts of the building materials) if they are to serve as proper targets for that practice...I cannot do justice here to the detail and care involved in Matthew's presentation of his case. (Guy Longworth, Mind)

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
Oxford University Press
Date d'édition
2007
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
0199211256
ISBN 13 
9780199211258
Reliure
Relié
Nombre de pages
278
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
Ufficio Anagrafiche Messaggerie
ufficio.anagrafiche@meli.it

Via Verdi, 8
Assago Milano
20090
Italie

Autres éditions populaires du même titre

9780199585533: The Measure of Mind: Propositional Attitudes and their Attribution

Edition présentée

ISBN 10 :  0199585539 ISBN 13 :  9780199585533
Editeur : Oxford University Press, USA, 2010
Couverture souple