Auction theory is now an important component of an economist's training. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.
This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. It allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results, covering the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and the theory of multi-object auctions.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Professor Flavio Menezes is the Foundation Director of the Australian Centre of Regulatory Economics at the ANU. He has published widely in economics of auctions and is regarded as Australasia's leading auction expert. Flavio Menezes has extensive teaching experience in the areas of game theory, industrial organization, and on the theory of incentives. He has presented seminars and delivered lectures in the Americas, Europe, and the Asia Pacific Region, has lectured to both academic audiences and practitioners, and has rich consulting experience, including advising internationally on a privatisation model for utilities, providing advice on electricity regulatory reform, and reviewing government procurement practices.
P. K. Monteiro received his PhD from IMPA in 1988. He has been at several institutions including UFRJ (1989-1993), IMPA (1994-1996, 1998-99), and EPGE-FGV (1999-present). He has been visiting fellow at CORE (1996-1997) and Copenhagen University (1997-1998). Monteiro works in General Equilibrium, Auction Theory, and Non-linear Pricing.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Southampton Books, Sag Harbor, NY, Etats-Unis
Hardcover. Etat : Like New. First Edition. First Edition, First Printing. Published by Oxford University Press, 2005. Octavo. Hardcover. Book is like new. No dust jacket. Previous owner name on flyleaf. N° de réf. du vendeur 535932
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Hardcover. Etat : Near Fine. No Jacket. 1st Edition. xiii, 178 pp; 17 figs. Original laminated glossy boards. Near Fine, without dust jacket (as issued). New price: US$85.00. 'This step-by-step, self-contained introduction to the theory of auctions allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through all the basic results in auction theory. Readers will work through the basic independent-private-model, understand the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue, develop a working knowledge of mechanism design, and be introduced to the theory of multi-object auctions' (Oxford University Press Web site). N° de réf. du vendeur 20124
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Auction theory is now an important component of an economist's training. The techniques and insights gained from the study of auction theory provide a useful starting point for those who want to venture into the economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics.This book provides a step-by-step, self-contained treatment of the theory of auctions. It allows students and readers with a calculus background to work through allthe basic results, covering the basic independent-private-model; the effects of introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behaviour and the seller's expected revenue; mechanism design; and thetheory of multi-object auctions. Offering an introduction to Auction theory, this book discusses the basic independent-private-model, introducing correlation in valuations on equilibrium behavior and the seller's expected revenue, mechanism design, and the theory of multi-object auctions. It is meant for use in economics of information, mechanism design, and regulatory economics. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780199275984
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