What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game.
A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Tilman Börgers is Samuel Zell Professor of the Economics of Risk at the University of Michigan. Before coming to Michigan in 2005, he was Professor of Economics at University College London. He holds a PhD in economics from the London School of Economics.; Daniel Krähmer is Full Professor of Economics in the Department of Economics at Universität Bonn, Germany.; Roland Strausz is Full Professor and Chair of the Institute for Economic Theory at Humboldt-Universität Berlin, Germany.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Hardcover. Etat : Good. 1st Edition. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In this book, Tilman Brgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument.An 8vo hardback in glossy black boards with gilt lettering to spine. The light green dust jacket has subtle finger prints and three short strokes from black ball-pens on surface. Tiny marks of light blue ink (probably from printing) to fore-edge, otherwise very good. Copyright ? OUP. N° de réf. du vendeur 463692
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Vendeur : Optimon Books, Gravesend, KENT, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : Good. 1st Edition. What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In this book, Tilman Brgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An 8vo hardback in glossy black boards with gilt lettering to spine. The greenish dust jacket is sealed in a transparent wrapper with three short strokes of black ink to surface and a few blue stain to its verso. Small corner of the plastic wrapper inside the top rear fold is crease and semi-detached. Also, tiny marks of blue ink (probably from printing) to fore-edge. Otherwise in very good condition. Copyright ? OUP. N° de réf. du vendeur 463660
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780199734023
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