What is the best way of auctioning an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, but the theory of mechanism design goes a step further to select the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself rather than the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
Tilman Borgers offers the first book-length introduction into the theory of mechanism design. Written in a very personal and masterful style, he carefully covers the main developments in theory of mechanism design-the theory of how to choose the rules of the game-over the past decades. It will be an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses for many years to come. (Dirk Bergemann, Douglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Chair, Yale University)
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Boergers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makespredictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game. A relatively new economic theory, mechanismdesign studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence ofdominant strategy voting mechanisms. Boergers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780199734023
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Etat : New. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design is a rigorous but accessible exploration mechanism design, also known as reverse game theory. Num Pages: 264 pages. BIC Classification: KCA; PBUD. Category: (G) General (US: Trade). Dimension: 165 x 243 x 26. Weight in Grams: 510. . 2015. 1st Edition. Hardcover. . . . . N° de réf. du vendeur V9780199734023
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