Regulation Versus Litigation: Perspectives from Economics and Law - Couverture rigide

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0226432181 ISBN 13 : 9780226432182

Editeur : University of Chicago Press, 2011

Synopsis

The efficacy of various political institutions is the subject of intense debate between proponents of broad legislative standards enforced through litigation and those who prefer regulation by administrative agencies. This book explores the trade-offs between litigation and regulation, the circumstances in which one approach may outperform the other, and the principles that affect the choice between addressing particular economic activities with one system or the other. Combining theoretical analysis with empirical investigation in a range of industries, including public health, financial markets, medical care, and workplace safety, Regulation versus Litigation sheds light on the costs and benefits of two important instruments of economic policy.

A propos du livre

À propos de l'auteur

Daniel P. Kessler is a professor at the Law School and Graduate School of Business, Stanford University; a senior fellow at Stanford's Hoover Institution; and a research associate of the NBER.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: University of Chicago Press
• Date d'édition: 2011
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0226432181
• ISBN 13: 9780226432182
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 344
• Éditeur: Kessler Daniel P.
• Coordonnées du fabricant: The University of Chicago Press; https://press.uchicago.edu/index.html; ; 5801 S. Ellis Avenue; Chicago; IL; 60637; Etats-Unis
• Personne responsable: non disponible