This study warns bankers, regulators, politicians, and taxpayers that no matter how well the deposit-insurance system may have run in the past it is headed for an expensive bureaucratic breakdown.
The system of federal deposit insurance adopted during the 1930s has become increasingly costly and unreliable. This timely study warns bankers, regulators, politicians, and taxpayers that no matter how well the deposit-insurance system may have run in the past it is headed for an expensive bureaucratic breakdown. It forcefully argues that unless market discipline can be reintroduced, this breakdown threatens to take depository institutions into de facto nationalization. Reversing these trends, it points out, requires redesigning the deposit insurance system to curtail the subsidizing of risk taking by deposit institutions, a practice that has resulted in widespread insolvency among financial institutions. The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance provides more than a warning. It shows that the current system is unfair and has transformed the federal government into the chief supplier of equity funds to depository institutions. And it observes that whenever the financial environment is changing rapidly, the existing system of deposit insurance subsidizes risk-taking in ways that impose a huge, but largely unrecognized burden on the general taxpayer and conservatively managed financial institutions. In one way or another, the taxpayer is going to be called upon to make good the financially staggering amount of the system's guarantees. The book provides a comprehensive discussion of FDIC and FSLIC policies and procedures, describes the variety of risks facing deposit institutions and their implications for the insurance system, explains the perverse risk-bearing incentives inherent in the current deposit insurance system, documents the extent of actual insolvency at insured institutions, and proposes a framework for reform.
The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance is eleventh in the series, Regulation of Economic Activity, edited by Richard Schmalensee.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Edward J. Kane is James F. Cleary Professor in Finance at Boston College.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, Etats-Unis
Etat : Very Good. First Edition. Former library copy. Pages intact with possible writing/highlighting. Binding strong with minor wear. Dust jackets/supplements may not be included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. N° de réf. du vendeur 13533381-6
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Better World Books, Mishawaka, IN, Etats-Unis
Etat : Good. First Edition. Former library copy. Pages intact with minimal writing/highlighting. The binding may be loose and creased. Dust jackets/supplements are not included. Includes library markings. Stock photo provided. Product includes identifying sticker. Better World Books: Buy Books. Do Good. N° de réf. du vendeur GRP90306446
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : -OnTimeBooks-, Phoenix, AZ, Etats-Unis
Etat : good. A copy that has been read, remains in good condition. All pages are intact, and the cover is intact. The spine and cover show signs of wear. Pages can include notes and highlighting and show signs of wear, and the copy can include "From the library of" labels or previous owner inscriptions. 100% GUARANTEE! Shipped with delivery confirmation, if you're not satisfied with purchase please return item! Ships via media mail. N° de réf. du vendeur OTV.0262111020.G
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Kloof Booksellers & Scientia Verlag, Amsterdam, Pays-Bas
Etat : as new. Cambridge, MA. : MIT Press, 1985. Hardcover. Dustjacket. 0 pp. Condition : as new copy. ISBN 9780262111027. Keywords : ECONOMICS, Deposit insurance. N° de réf. du vendeur 280977
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)