Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. Ever since Descartes formulated the mind-body problem, a long line of philosophers has found the physicalist view to be preposterous. According to John Perry, the history of the mind-body problem is, in part, the slow victory of physical monism over various forms of dualism. Each new version of dualism claims that surely something more is going on with us than the merely physical.
In this book Perry defends a view that he calls antecedent physicalism. He takes on each of three major arguments against physicalism, showing that they pose no threat to antecedent physicalism. These arguments are the zombie argument (that there is a possible world inhabited by beings that are physically indiscernible from us but not conscious), the knowledge argument (that we can know facts about our own feelings that are not just physical facts, thereby proving physicalism false), and the modal argument (that the identity of sensation and brain state is contingent, but since there is no such thing as contingent identity, sensations are not brain states).
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
John Perry is the H. W. Stuart Professor of Philosophy at Stanford University.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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hardcover. Etat : Near Fine. Etat de la jaquette : Near Fine. 1st Edition. 1st edition, MIT Press hardcover w/ DJ, 2001. Book is Near Fine, w/ clean text, binding tight enough to suggest it is unread. DJ is Near Fine, w/ very light edge/shelf wear (no tears or chips). Free delivery confirmation. N° de réf. du vendeur SKU1021829
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Hardcover. Etat : Very Good. Etat de la jaquette : Very Good. Octavo. Green cloth boards have minimal signs of wear. (xvi)229pp. Pencil underlining, passage scoring and margin notations up to page 49. Complete jacket has rubbed upper right front corner and light handling wear to surfaces and perimeter. N° de réf. du vendeur ABE-1740519948689
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Vendeur : Bookbot, Prague, Rébublique tchèque
Hardcover. Etat : As New. Leichte Kratzer / Abnutzungen / Druckstellen. Physicalism is the idea that if everything that goes on in the universe is physical, our consciousness and feelings must also be physical. Ever since Descartes formulated the mind-body problem, a long line of philosophers has found the physicalist view to be preposterous. According to John Perry, the history of the mind-body problem is, in part, the slow victory of physical monism over various forms of dualism. Each new version of dualism claims that surely something more is going on with us than the merely physical. In this book Perry defends a view that he calls antecedent physicalism. He takes on each of three major arguments against physicalism, showing that they pose no threat to antecedent physicalism. These arguments are the zombie argument (that there is a possible world inhabited by beings that are physically indiscernible from us but not conscious), the knowledge argument (that we can know facts about our own feelings that are not just physical facts, thereby proving physicalism false), and the modal argument (that the identity of sensation and brain state is contingent, but since there is no such thing as contingent identity, sensations are not brain states). N° de réf. du vendeur 121e39ee-beb3-4dc5-946f-236f1a80b97d
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rilegato hardcover. Etat : Ottimo (Fine). 2001. Copertina editoriale rigida e sovraccoperta alettata. 238 p.; 22 cmSL.33. Book. N° de réf. du vendeur bc_218770
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