Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by anti-individualism, which holds that a subject's thoughts are determined not only by what is inside her head but also by aspects of her environment. Despite its dominance, anti-individualism is subject to a daunting array of epistemological objections: that it is incompatible with the privileged access each subject has to her thoughts, that it undermines rationality, and, absurdly, that it provides a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. In this rigorous and persuasive study, Jessica Brown defends anti-individualism from these epistemological objections. The discussion has important consequences for key epistemological issues such as skepticism, closure, transmission, and the nature of knowledge and warrant.
According to Brown's analysis, one main reason for thinking that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access is that it undermines a subject's introspective ability to distinguish types of thoughts. So diagnosed, the standard focus on a subject's reliability about her thoughts provides no adequate reply. Brown defuses the objection by appeal to the epistemological notion of a relevant alternative. Further, she argues that, given a proper understanding of rationality, anti-individualism is compatible with the notion that we are rational subjects. However, the discussion of rationality provides a new argument that anti-individualism is in tension with Fregean sense. Finally, Brown shows that anti-individualism does not create a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. While rejecting solutions that restrict the transmission of warrant, she argues that anti-individualists should deny that we have the type of knowledge that would be required to use a priori knowledge of thought content to gain a priori knowledge of the world.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Jessica Brown is Chair in Philosophy at the University of St. Andrews, Scotland.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
EUR 3,84 expédition vers Etats-Unis
Destinations, frais et délaisEUR 3,52 expédition vers Etats-Unis
Destinations, frais et délaisVendeur : Powell's Bookstores Chicago, ABAA, Chicago, IL, Etats-Unis
Etat : Used - Like New. Fine. Paperback. 2004. Originally published at $26.00. N° de réf. du vendeur W78770
Quantité disponible : 20 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Better World Books Ltd, Dunfermline, Royaume-Uni
Etat : Good. Ships from the UK. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages. N° de réf. du vendeur GRP98780057
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Bill & Ben Books, Faringdon, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Good. A persuasive monograph that answers the keyepistemological arguments against anti-individualism in thephilosophy of mind. N° de réf. du vendeur 0093958
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Kloof Booksellers & Scientia Verlag, Amsterdam, Pays-Bas
Etat : as new. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004. Paperback. 360 pp.(Contemporary Philosophical Monographs). - Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by anti- individualism, which holds that a subject's thoughts are determined not only by what is inside her head but also by aspects of her environment. Despite its dominance, anti-individualism is subject to a daunting array of epistemological objections: that it is incompatible with the privileged access each subject has to her thoughts, that it undermines rationality, and, absurdly, that it provides a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. In this rigorous and persuasive study, Jessica Brown defends anti- individualism from these epistemological objections. The discussion has important consequences for key epistemological issues such as skepticism, closure, transmission, and the nature of knowledge and warrant.According to Brown's analysis, one main reason for thinking that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access is that it undermines a subject's introspective ability to distinguish types of thoughts. So diagnosed, the standard focus on a subject's reliability about her thoughts provides no adequate reply. Brown defuses the objection by appeal to the epistemological notion of a relevant alternative. Further, she argues that, given a proper understanding of rationality, anti- individualism is compatible with the notion that we are rational subjects. However, the discussion of rationality provides a new argument that anti-individualism is in tension with Fregean sense. Finally, Brown shows that anti-individualism does not create a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. While rejecting solutions that restrict the transmission of warrant, she argues that anti-individualists should deny that we have the type of knowledge that would be required to use a priori knowledge of thought content to gain a priori knowledge of the world. Editorial Reviews Condition : as new copy. ISBN 9780262524216. Keywords : PHILOSOPHY, N° de réf. du vendeur 195606
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Kloof Booksellers & Scientia Verlag, Amsterdam, Pays-Bas
Etat : as new. Cambridge, MA.:The MIT Press, 2004. Paperback. 360 pp. - Contemporary philosophy of mind is dominated by anti-individualism, which holds that a subject's thoughts are determined not only by what is inside her head but also by aspects of her environment. Despite its dominance, anti-individualism is subject to a daunting array of epistemological objections: that it is incompatible with the privileged access each subject has to her thoughts, that it undermines rationality, and, absurdly, that it provides a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. In this rigorous and persuasive study, Jessica Brown defends anti-individualism from these epistemological objections. The discussion has important consequences for key epistemological issues such as skepticism, closure, transmission, and the nature of knowledge and warrant. According to Brown's analysis, one main reason for thinking that anti-individualism is incompatible with privileged access is that it undermines a subject's introspective ability to distinguish types of thoughts. So diagnosed, the standard focus on a subject's reliability about her thoughts provides no adequate reply. Brown defuses the objection by appeal to the epistemological notion of a relevant alternative. Further, she argues that, given a proper understanding of rationality, anti-individualism is compatible with the notion that we are rational subjects. However, the discussion of rationality provides a new argument that anti-individualism is in tension with Fregean sense. Finally, Brown shows that anti-individualism does not create a new route to a priori knowledge of the world. While rejecting solutions that restrict the transmission of warrant, she argues that anti-individualists should deny that we have the type of knowledge that would be required to use a priori knowledge of thought content to gain a priori knowledge of the world. Condition : as new copy. ISBN 9780262524216. Keywords : PHILOSOPHY, N° de réf. du vendeur 290722
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : BennettBooksLtd, North Las Vegas, NV, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title! 0.85. N° de réf. du vendeur Q-026252421X
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Studibuch, Stuttgart, Allemagne
paperback. Etat : Gut. 360 Seiten; 9780262524216.3 Gewicht in Gramm: 500. N° de réf. du vendeur 938793
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)