Monetary Policy and Politics: Rules Versus Discretion - Couverture rigide

Macesich, George

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0275943356 ISBN 13 : 9780275943356

Editeur : Praeger Publishers Inc, 1992

Synopsis

Macesich's latest book argues that the poor performance of monetary policy can be attributed to the ease with which money slips into the political arena to become a singularly important political issue. Discretionary authority facilitates monetary manipulation for political ends, thereby increasing uncertainty and casting doubt on money, the monetary system, and indeed the monetary authority itself. The author traces the evolution of the debate over rules versus discretionary authority and discusses various methods that economists have proposed for constrain the monetary authority. If monetary policy is to be credible and thus successful, the hands of monetary policy makers are better tied than left free.

This work by a noted authority on monetary theory and policy will interest economists in academia and the policy-making community.

A propos du livre

À propos de l'auteur

GEORGE MACESICH is Professor of Economics and Director of the Center for Yugoslav-American Studies at Florida State University. He is the author of numerous books including Money and Democracy (Praeger, 1990), Monetary Reform and Cooperation Theory (Praeger, 1989), and Monetary Policy and Rational Expectations (Praeger, 1987).

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Praeger Publishers Inc
• Date d'édition: 1992
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0275943356
• ISBN 13: 9780275943356
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 176
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: GPSR Kontakt; gpsr@libri.de; ; Europaallee 1; Bad Hersfeld; 36244; Allemagne