Why have the economies of some developing countries fallen back while others have advanced? Why have so many stabilization and structural adjustment programs failed to deliver growth dividends? This book shows that there is a common and valid answer: political credibility defined as the predictability of the institutional rules of the game. This case is not only argued theoretically but also found to be confirmed by empirical analysis. Ten case studies pitting Latin American countries against Southeast Asian ones reveal the sources of political credibility. Economic openness is the necessary precondition, long-term reputation or democratic participation the sufficient one. Despite the seemingly superior strength of authoritarian reputation democratic control is the more successful road.
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Hardcover. Etat : Fine. Etat de la jaquette : Fine. 216pp. Owner's signature on endpaper. Size: 8vo - over 7¾" - 9¾" tall. N° de réf. du vendeur 058184
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