Property Relations, Incentives and Welfare - Couverture rigide
Livre 64 sur 112: International Economic Association
Synopsis
The dramatic implosion of the centrally administered, non-democratic political systems in central and eastern Europe in the late 1980s have generated a body of research concerning the transition from public ownership, and the role of the market and other institutions in engendering good incentives for economic actors. The essays collected in this volume study property relations, their associated incentives and the consequent effects on welfare: the ubiquitous theme is that efficiency cannot be divorced from the distribution of productive assets. This volume brings together selected papers and comments on property relations delivered at a conference held in Barcelona under the auspices of the IEA in collaboration with the Caixa de Cataluna, Barcelona, the Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona, the Universidad Internacional Menendez Pelayo and the Generalitat de Cataluna.
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À propos de l?auteur
JOHN E. ROEMER is Professor of Economics at the University of California, Davis, where he is also Director of the Program on Economy, Justice and Society. He is the author of over 90 academic articles and eight books including Egalitarian Perspectives: Essays in Philosphical Economics and A Future for Socialism. Roemer is on the board of several academic journals, and is associate editor of the Journal of Economic Perspectives, the Journal of Economic Literature and Economic Design. He has been a Fellow of the Econometric Society since 1986.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
