9780415071055: Thought and Language

Synopsis

In this examination of the bases of thought and language, Professor Julius Moravcsik explores recent approaches to these topics and discusses the philosophical assumptions behind theories of language. He puts forward a new theory of meaning that is also a proposal about human concepts: viewing meanings as explanatory schemata and interpreting human cognition as primarily explanation-seeking, rather than information processing. This view of cognition, Professor Moravcsik argues, need not commit itself to either dualism or materialism. He defends the Platonic assumptions of his proposal, showing them to be no less "scientific" than current fashionable alternatives. Professor Moravcsik explores new ways of philosophizing that differ from analytic philosophy and its continental alternatives, and indicates how philosophers today can construct proposals about thought and language that have both conceptual and empirical import. This book should be of interest to students and teachers of philosophy of language and philosophy of mind, and advanced students of cognitive science and linguistics.

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Présentation de l'éditeur

Originally published in 1990, this book centres on a certain way of surveying a variety of theories of language, and on outlining a new proposal of meaning within the framework set by the survey. One of the key features of both survey and proposal is the insistence on the need to locate theories of language within a large framework that includes questions about the nature of thought and about general ontological questions as well. The book deals in an interconnected way with both very general and specific issues. At one end of this spectrum there are discussions of the contrast between realist and nominalist ontologies, while at the other are analyses of specific lexical items of English.

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