Marx and Wittgenstein - Couverture souple

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 0415758483 ISBN 13 : 9780415758482

Editeur : Routledge, 2014

Synopsis

At first sight, Karl Marx and Ludwig Wittgenstein may well seem to be as different from each other as it is possible for the ideas of two major intellectuals to be. Despite this standard conception, however, a small number of scholars have long suggested that there are deeper philosophical commonalities between Marx and Wittgenstein. They have argued that, once grasped, these commonalities can radically change and enrich understanding both of Marxism and of Wittgensteinian philosophy. This book develops and extends this unorthodox view, emphasising the mutual enrichment that comes from bringing Marx's and Wittgenstein's ideas into dialogue with one another. Essential reading for all scholars and philosophers interested in the Marxist philosophy and the philosophy of Wittgenstein, this book will also be of vital interest to those studying and researching in the fields of social philosophy, political philosophy, philosophy of social science and political economy.

A propos du livre

À propos de l?auteur

Gavin Kitching is a Professor of Politics at the University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. In addition to Karl Marx and the Philosophy of Praxis (Routledge, 1988) and Marxism and Science: Analysis of an Obsession (Penn State, 1994), he has written books on Africa, Third World development and globalisation. A collection of personal essays, Wittgenstein and Society, will be published in 2003.,
Nigel Pleasants is Lecturer in Sociology and Philosophy at the University of Exeter, UK. He is the author of Wittgenstein and the Idea of a Critical Social Theory: A Critique of Giddens, Habermas and Bhaskar (Routledge, 1999).

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Routledge
• Date d'édition: 2014
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0415758483
• ISBN 13: 9780415758482
• Reliure: Broché
• Nombre de pages: 320
• Éditeur: Kitching Gavin, Pleasants Nigel
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: non disponible