Court-directed animus has come and gone with some regularity since the founding of the republic, from the time the Jeffersonian Republican Congress attempted to undo what it saw as the outgoing Federalists' damage, to Roosevelt's efforts to pack the Supreme Court to protect the New Deal. As Charles Geyh points out, the battle over appointments is often a fruitless struggle, since judges are free to ignore the circumstances once they accept a seat on the bench. In Geyh's view, Congress would actually have better luck controlling the courts through a variety of other means: impeaching uncooperative judges, eliminating or gerrymandering their jurisdictions, stripping them of oversight powers, or slashing their budgets. Legislators have long used such tactics to bring wayward appointees from other branches to heel. Yet, while the nomination process has often been bitter and partisan, no federal judge has ever been impeached on the basis of his or her decisions. The explanation for this incongruity, Geyh suggests, is not a simple Constitutional balance of powers, but a "dynamic equilibrium": a constant give-and-take between Congressional efforts to control the judiciary on the one hand, and historical norms of judicial independence on the other.
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Charles Geyh is Professor of Law and Harry T. Ice Faculty Fellow at Indiana University. He has served as director of the American Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Independence, reporter to American Bar Association commissions on judicial independence and public financing of judicial elections, and counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the U. S. House of Representatives.
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Hardcover, with dust jacket. 332 pages. Text in English. Small crease in the dust jacket, otherwise as new. ''This is quite simply the best study of judicial independence that I have ever read; it is erudite, historically aware, and politically astute.'' -Malcolm M. Feeley, Claire Sanders Clements Dean's Professor, Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California at Berkeley ''Professor Geyh has written a wise and timely book that is informed by the author's broad and deep experience working with the judicial and legislative branches, by the insights of law, history and political science, and by an appreciation of theory and common sense.'' -Stephen B. Burbank, David Berger Professor for the Administration of Justice, University of Pennsylvania Law School With Congress threatening to ''go nuclear'' over judicial appointments, and lawmakers accusing judges of being ''arrogant, out of control, and unaccountable,'' many pundits see a dim future for the autonomy of America's courts. But do we really understand the balance between judicial independence and Congress's desire to limit judicial reach? Charles Geyh's When Courts and Congress Collide is the most sweeping study of this question to date, and an unprecedented analysis of the relationship between Congress and our federal courts. Efforts to check the power of the courts have come and gone throughout American history, from the Jeffersonian Congress's struggle to undo the work of the Federalists, to FDR's campaign to pack the Supreme Court, to the epic Senate battles over the Bork and Thomas nominations. If legislators were solely concerned with curbing the courts, Geyh suggests, they would use direct means, such as impeaching uncooperative judges, gerrymandering their jurisdictions, stripping the bench's oversight powers, or slashing judicial budgets. Yet, while Congress has long been willing to influence judicial decision-making indirectly by blocking the appointments of ideologically unacceptable nominees, it has, with only rare exceptions, resisted employing more direct methods of control. When Courts and Congress Collide is the first work to demonstrate that this balance is governed by a ''dynamic equilibrium'': a constant give-and-take between Congress's desire to control the judiciary and its respect for historical norms of judicial independence. It is this dynamic equilibrium, Geyh says, rather than what the Supreme Court or the Constitution says about the separation of powers, that defines the limits of the judiciary's independence. When Courts and Congress Collide is a groundbreaking work, requiring all of us to consider whether we are on the verge of radically disrupting our historic balance of governance. Charles Gardner Geyh is Professor of Law and Charles L. Whistler Faculty Fellow at Indiana University at Bloomington. He has served as director of the American Judicature Society's Center for Judicial Independence, reporter to the American Bar Association Commission on Separation of Powers and Judicial Independence, and counsel to the Judiciary Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. 777g. N° de réf. du vendeur 89007
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