Reproduction and Social Organization in Sub-Saharan Africa - Couverture rigide

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0520063635 ISBN 13 : 9780520063631

Editeur : University of California Press, 1989

Synopsis

Unlike most Asian and Latin American countries, sub-Saharan Africa has seen both an increase in population growth rates and a weakening of traditional patterns of child-spacing since the 1960s. It is tempting to conclude that sub-Saharan countries have simply not reached adequate levels of income, education, and urbanization for a fertility decline to occur. This book argues, however, that such a socioeconomic threshold hypothesis will not provide an adequate basis for comparison.

These authors take the view that any reproductive regime is also anchored to a broader pattern of social organization, including the prevailing modes of production, rules of exchange, patterns of religious systems, kinship structure, division of labor, and gender roles. They link the characteristic features of the African reproductive regime with regard to nuptiality, polygyny, breastfeeding, postpartum abstinence, sterility, and child-fostering to other specifically African characteristics of social organization and culture. Substantial attention is paid to the heterogeneity that prevails among sub-Saharan societies and considerable use is made, therefore, of interethnic comparisons. As a result the book goes considerably beyond mere demographic description and builds bridges between demography and anthropology or sociology.

A propos du livre

À propos de l'auteur

Ron J. Lesthaeghe is Professor of Sociology and Demography and Director of the Sociology Research Center at the Vrije Universiteit of Brussels. He has been the author or editor of several other books in the field of demography.

À propos de la quatrième de couverture

"A unique and pathbreaking work that will exert a lasting influence on the thinking of demographers, anthropologists, and development specialists working in Africa."—Etienne van de Walle, Population Studies Center, University of Pennsylvania

"The collection is remarkable in its concentration on culturally-bound determinants of fertility that are particular to Africa and consequently require a departure from the now classical styles of demographic analysis for other regions. . . . A high-quality treatment of a topic of quite broad interest."—Odile Frank, World Health Organization, Geneva

Extrait. © Reproduit sur autorisation. Tous droits réservés.

Reproduction and Social Organization in Sub-Saharan Africa

By Ron J. Lesthaeghe, editor

University of California Press

Copyright 1989 Ron J. Lesthaeghe, editor
All right reserved.
ISBN: 0520063635
Introduction
Ron Lesthaeghe

There were several reasons for undertaking this project on reproduction and social organization in sub-Saharan Africa. Some were of a theoretical nature, whereas others stemmed from the need for a structuring of the recently increased flow of demographic information from the region. The book falls squarely in the tradition of cross-cultural comparative analysis. As such it addresses several limitations apparent in much of the existing comparative demographic literature.

A first issue concerns the inadequacies of worldwide comparisons based on a purely statistical analysis of the links between demographic variables and standard indicators of socioeconomic development. For instance, many Latin American and Asian populations have witnessed a substantial fall in fertility since the 1970s, whereas sub-Saharan populations have tended to have had constant or even rising fertility during the postcolonial period. It is tempting to compare the latter with the former in terms of a series of general development indicators, and to conclude from a set of regressions that sub-Saharan Africa has not produced a fertility transition simply because it has not yet reached adequate levels of income, schooling, urbanization, or family planning effort. This is essentially the conclusion of the World Bank report of 1986. Any worldwide comparison made today would indeed produce this statistical outcome. But, does this mean that Nigeria or Zaire will have a fertility decline as impressive as that of Thailand or Indonesia from the moment they reach the same income per capita, attain the same schooling level, or spend the same amount per capita on family planning? Such international statistical comparisons assume a socioeconomic threshold beyond which transitions in nuptiality and fertility take place. Unfortunately, such threshold hypotheses have failed to draw support from actual experience to date (see Knodel and van de Walle, 1979), and consequently, there must be

numerous other factors of social complexity mediating the process. In other words, the comparison of sub-Saharan Africa with other continents solely in terms of economic or programmatic indicators is a hazardous one today and will remain so in the future. The prime concern of this book is, therefore, to describe the link between the characteristics of reproduction in sub-Saharan Africa and the particular patterns of social organization in the region and to draw attention to the meaning of these context-specific links both for understanding the continent's recent demographic history and for speculating about the future of demographic change.

The next classic feature of many comparative analyses is the assumption that everything that is not "economic" must be "cultural." Economists and sociologists, who are about equally represented among the practitioners of demography, are often hopelessly divided on this issue. One commonly finds that measures of socioeconomic development operating at the macro level, or economic variables specifying the demand for children at the household level, account for only a small portion of the observed variance. The same also holds at the intermediate level, that is, for villages or communities, with respect to infrastructural variables, including medical and family planning facilities. John Casterline (1985, p. 73), for instance, concludes:

Totalling up the statistically significant findings leaves one almost empty-handed. Measures of community developmentagricultural modernization, non-agricultural economic activities, village modernization as measured by the presence of utilities and amenitiesrarely show systematic relationships with fertility. . . . One cannot help but think that were community featuressuch as clinics, schools, availability of electricity and piped water, or paved roadsinfluencing reproductive behaviour through some means, this fact would be more apparent in the results.

By contrast, attention is often drawn by sociologists to the "explanatory power" of variables such as region, language, or ethnicity at the macro level, or to that of religion at the individual level. Such variables have indeed explained nonnegligible portions of the observed variance in fertility. This was essentially the outcome of the Princeton studies of the historical European fertility transitions. More recently, a host of similar findings have been commented upon by John Cleland and Christopher Wilson (1987) in their much broader survey of fertility transitions in both industrialized and developing nations. They too hold the view that ideational changes and the spread of new ideas are of major importance.

This "cultural" approach has major problems as well. First of all, economists quickly point out that these features do not constitute "policy variables." Cultural variables are at most interesting, but are irrelevant for planning and policy formulation. Second, "cultural" explanations are frequently residual explanations, or a messy bag into which everything is relegated that

is not properly understood. It is very easy to introduce a nominal variable denoting ethnic group or language in any multivariate analysis and to assess its statistical significance and impact on the dependent variables. It is quite a different matter to explain on substantive grounds what such statistical results really mean. What is commonly lacking is a much more precise specification of these "cultural proxies."

The common explanation for linguistic effects, for example, is that language stands for communication density, which fosters the spread of new ideas: linguistic borders inhibit their diffusion. But language is invariably related to region and ethnicity, and therefore also to politics. In other words, used as an explanatory variable, language absorbs many other effects as well. Ethnicity is even more problematic, and specifications of its meaning (other than connecting it back to language and innovation or diffusion) are exceedingly rare in demographic analyses.

Even before starting this analysis of the existing and new demographic data for sub-Saharan Africa, we were sure that language, ethnicity, or region were going to play a major role, but that a mere statistical description of their effects would be devoid of any further meaning. This is the case, of course, unless, one can find a way of defining "cultural entities" in terms of other characteristics that need not be "cultural" in the narrow sense of the term (i.e., pertaining to normative systems). Our basic choice has, therefore, been to connect ethnicity to selected characteristics of social organization. Examples of such characteristics of variables are the productive value of women in the various types of traditional economies, the patterns of lineage organization and of exchange or rights in women between lineages, or the structural changes in social organization introduced by the penetration of non-African religions. In other words, ethnicity is translated into several features that pertain to the traditional modes of production and the structuring of gender relations. These are taken as the historical roots of sub-Saharan social organization, upon which later changes have been grafted. Such changes have stemmed from major alterations of the land tenure systems, the growth of wage sectors in the economy, rapid urbanization during the postcolonial period, or the general emergence of marked stratification by social class. All of these have been intricately interwoven during the course of history and the resulting picture is not only complex but also highly diversified.

As a result, we considered it necessary to offer a summary of the specific sub-Saharan features or social organization in chapter 1. Obviously, one cannot do justice to two centuries of economic and social change in all parts of this heterogeneous continent in just a single chapter. But we hope that this chapter gives the non-Africanist a feel for the basic organizational and socioeconomic differentiation and offers a justification for linking "reproduction" to "production."

This link owes tribute to the tradition of anthropological and ethno-

graphic research and relies not only on their descriptions, but also on the interpretations that are given to all major features of ethnic-specific patterns of social organization. The best-known attempt at systematizing the massive amount of information is beyond doubt still G. P. Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas, also known as the Yale Human Relations Area files. Our "operationalization" of ethnicity is largely dependent on Murdock's classifications. These were supplemented by an independent scanning of ethnographic references, which resulted in alteration of a few codes and the construction of additional variables. Inasmuch as structuralfunctionalist anthropology drew elegant, holistic pictures of discrete societies, however, it tended not to engage in extensive comparative approaches. To compensate for that, we have drawn on the work of Ester Boserup (1970) and Jack Goody (1976) who offered precise and especially verifiable propositions with respect to the links between reproductive systems on the one hand, and modes of production, gender relations, and exchange of the productive and reproductive capacities of women on the other. Their propositions, along with those of several other authors, are also described in chapter I. The empirical verification of these propositions on the basis of demographic and ethnographic information files is presented in chapter 2 (Lesthaeghe and Eelens), chapter 3 (Lesthaeghe, Vanderhoeft, Gaisie, and Delaine), and chapter 6 (Lesthaeghe, Kaufmann, and Meekers). As it will be seen, then, the anthropological tradition centering on modes of production and the economic value of women provides a starting point for this book.

Chapter 2 essentially links the components of the spacing pattern of reproduction (i.e., breastfeeding, lactational amenorrhea, postpartum abstinence, and contraception) to indicators of both traditional social organization and recent socioeconomic change. The demographic data base used here is derived from the World Fertility Surveys (WFS) that were held between 1976 and 1981 in ten sub-Saharan African countries: Mauritania, Senegal, the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Benin, Nigeria, Cameroon, Kenya, Sudan (northern part only), and Lesotho. These surveys had the advantage of using a common core-questionnaire facilitating standardized measurement. However, it should be borne in mind that the WFS was designed primarily as an instrument for demographic measurement and not as a tool for studying cultural variation or socioeconomic change. The WFS demographic data must therefore be linked to information from other sources, and both region and ethnicity as units are used for merging the demographic data with the cultural and socioeconomic data from other sources. Chapter 3 (Lesthaeghe, Vanderhoeft, Gaisie, and Delaine) also contains an elaboration of the WFS data files, but two additional features are introduced here. First, we were also interested in the combinatory effect of the so-called intermediate fertility variables upon overall fertility. This tradition in demography recognizes that

economic, social, and cultural factors act upon the various components of fertility separately. In a subsequent phase these effects are aggregated in order to elucidate patterns of reinforcement or neutralization (e.g., shorter lactational amenorrhea compensated by more contraception). The first exhaustive layout of the "intermediate fertility variables"scheme was given by Kingsley Davis and Judith Blake in 1956. Measurement of the various components remained fragmentary, however, until the 1970s. Subsequently, data gathering became more systematic as a result of renewed interest in both historical demography and Third World demography. John Bongaarts' statistical framework of 1978 in particular facilitated the integration of each of the components into overall fertility analysis. Since our own earlier work in African demography (Page and Lesthaeghe, 1981) falls in this tradition, we could not miss the opportunity to incorporate the new WFS information on the intermediate fertility variables in a broader African comparison. More specifically, we wanted to establish to what extent the initial fertility-increasing effect of female literacy and enhanced education, operating through reduced lactation and shortened postpartum abstinence, is currently being offset by increased contraceptive use. This involves a more technical "nuts and bolts" section in chapter 3 dealing with the measurement of what we have called "the postpartum abstinence bonus."

The assessment of the educational effect through the intermediate fertility variables leads us to the second part of chapter 3, which contains a multilevel analysis. Here the effect on the intermediate fertility variables of educational differences between individuals within each region is compared across regions. Contextual variables, that is, characteristics of the regions rather than of individuals, are used in this cross-regional analysis. The set of contextual variables employed contains features of traditional social organization (i.e., the economic value of women derived from their traditional involvement in trade), variables concerning the impact of historical Western and Islamic penetrations, and indicators of regional socioeconomic development.

The intellectual impact of Boserup and Goody is particularly obvious in chapter 6, which looks at the various patterns of nuptiality and their recent change. These authors originally formulated their propositions for the world as a whole, not just for sub-Saharan Africa. Their statistical tests were, therefore, performed on a global sample of ethnic groups. As a result, they essentially account for major differences in the nature of reproductive regimes between continents, especially those between Eurasia and sub-Saharan Africa. The question remains, however, whether their theses are equally capable of distinguishing between African societies, that is, in a setting characterized by much less heterogeneity than that found in a global sample.

Another intellectual tradition providing ample grist for our milland the basis of our next group of chaptershas been the sociological literature on

social change and the family. Much of that literature centers on the concept of Westernization, that is, the penetration of Western ideals about the conjugal family which provide a direction for family change in the Third World. The shift towards nuclear residence patterns for households, and especially towards European-like conjugal marriage, is seen as taking place either because corporate kinship systems or extended families are too rigid and curtail individual freedom, or because their economic basis is gradually being withdrawn. In short, nonwestern family systems are presented as being sooner or later condemned, for both economic and ideological reasons. The literature of this nature is substantial and there exist many variations on the theme. But two authors have been particularly influential in family sociology and social demography, largely because of their erudition in studying worldwide patterns. We refer here to William Goode who published his World Revolution and Family Patterns in 1963 (second edition 1970) and John Caldwell who brought his most important articles together in his Theory of Fertility Decline of 1982. Goode's prediction of the direction of family change is very straightforward (1970, p. 368369):

We have stated as an initial point of view, validated throughout by data, that the direction of change for each characteristic of the family might be very different from one culture to another, even though the pattern of movement for the system as a whole is toward a variant of the conjugal type [our italics].

By separate characteristics of the family Goode refers to specific variables such as illegitimacy or divorce, which may be very different at the onset and which can therefore evolve in opposite directions in different cultural contexts as the general pattern evolves towards more conjugality. Goode attributes a major role to the ideological variables, that is, to the formation of a global community in the cultural sense (p. 369):

We have asserted that we do not believe that the theoretical relations between a developing industrial system and the conjugal family system are entirely clear. On the empirical side we suggest that the changes that have taken place have been far more rapid than could be supposed or predicted from the degree of industrialization alone. We have insisted, instead, on the independent power of ideological variables. Everywhere the ideology of the conjugal family is spreading, even though a majority does not accept it. It appeals to the disadvantaged, to the young, to the women, and to the educated. It promises freedom and new alternatives as against the rigidities and controls of traditional systems. It is as effective as the appeal of freedom or land redistribution or an attack on the existing stratification system. It is radical, and it is arousing support in many areas where the rate of industrialization is very slight.

Goode is, however, equally convinced that the old systems will lose their functional rationale as peasant economies are replaced by industrial ones. The quotation cited above is immediately followed by (p. 369):

Yet, the ideology of the conjugal system would have only a minimal impact if each newly emerging system did not furnish some independent base for implementing the new choices implicit in the ideology.

For Africa, Goode's scenario is indeed revolutionary, especially as far as the proposed pace of the change is concerned (p. 201202):

If the new African nations follow the path of many other emerging nations, the next decade [our italics] will witness an accentuated move away from tribal family patterns, and toward a conjugal system. The resurgence of pride in the indigenous heritage will not buttress traditional family patterns, because the effort to be accepted by older nations as "modern" or "civilized" will create continuing social and legal forces in line with "progressive" family sentiments and behaviour.

Admittedly this quotation starts with a conditional "if," but in accordance with the optimism of the 1960s, Goode does not envisage the contrary, that is, that African nations would not follow the development path of newly industrializing Asian societies.

John Caldwell is considerably more cautious about the speed of the transformation, and this is undoubtedly due to his firsthand experience in tropical Africa. But he too stresses the role of Westernization, the formation of a global society (as distinct from a global economy) and the concomitant spread of the nuclear and conjugal family. The following quotation from his restatement of the theory of fertility transition speaks for itself (1982, p. 153):

In the present situation, family nuclearization and the reversal of intergenerational wealth flow are likely to penetrate deeply into the Third World in the next half century, almost independently of the success of industrialization, and almost inevitably they will guarantee slower global population growth.

Also the source of this independent shift towards the conjugal and nuclear family is explicitly treated (1982, p. 153):

An emphasis must be placed here on the export of the European social system as well as its economic system. It is absurd to deny that this is the central feature of our times as to deny the significance of the Hellinization of southwest Asia, the Romanization of the Mediterranean and western Europe, and the Sinoization of much of southeast and central Asia in other periods. . . . From the demographic viewpoint, the most important social exports have been the concept of the predominance of the nuclear family with its strong conjugal tie, and the concept of concentrating concern and expenditure on one's own children.

Caldwell's theory is remarkable in a number of ways. The main vehicle for Westernization is formal education. As such, education assumes a major cultural role along with the mere economic role assigned to it by the Chicago school of economists who define it in terms of greater direct and indirect

costs of children. But even more important is that Caldwell views the emergence of the conjugal family as the conditio sine qua non for reversal of the traditional intergenerational "wealth flow" from young to old, and consequently as a prerequisite for a fertility transition.

To sum up, there is a remarkable congruence between Goode and Caldwell since both attribute a major role to the spread of a Western family model in triggering off changes in the social and economic relations in the family or between generations, and ultimately in producing a fertility transition.

The obvious questions now are whether such changes in the sub-Saharan family system have taken place and whether they will be necessary to produce a fertility decline. This issue is taken up in several chapters in this book, especially those that deal with nuptiality systems and child-fosterage. The Goode and Caldwell theories impinge directly upon demographic issues such as the survival of polygyny, the age gap between husbands and wives, the ages at first union formation, and the circulation of children. The issue of polygyny is taken up in chapter 5 (Goldman and Pebley), 6 (Lesthaeghe, Kaufmann, and Meekers), and 7 (Pebley and Mbugua), that of child circulation in chapters 9 (Page) and 10 (Bledsoe and Isiugo-Abanihe).

Chapter 5 treats the formal demographic aspects of polygyny. It is well known that widespread polygyny is possible only as a result of a large age gap between husbands and wives and hence as a consequence of early marriage for women, late marriage for men, and rapid remarriage of widows and divorces. Polygyny and widow inheritance are features that are diametrical opposites of the Western conjugal family type, as Goode and numerous other authors have recognized. The importance of the chapter by Goldman and Pebley lies in the study of the demographic potential for polygyny rather than in its mere incidence. They show, for instance, how this potential is enhanced by a young age composition of the population resulting in relatively large generations of young women, and hence by fast population growth. As sub-Saharan demographic growth is currently breaking all records with rates of 2.5 to 4.0 percent in most areas, and since this is largely due to high fertility, additional support is being given to the maintenance of this potential for polygyny in the future. They show, furthermore, that feasible reductions in mortality and modest declines in fertility still leave sufficient potential for the institution to survive.

The same topic is also considered in the first part of chapter 6, showing the impact of different schedules of widowhood or divorce and remarriage and of different levels of fertility on a series of polygyny measures. The rest of chapter 6 is devoted largely to the measurement of regional and ethnic variations in the actual incidence of polygyny and to the analysis of the connections with the social organization features used in Boserup's and Goody's theories. Another section of chapter 6 tries to assess trends in ages at first marriage for both sexes and in polygyny levels. The outcome is that not only

the formal demographic potential for polygyny, but also its actual incidence, show no major sign of decline despite the widespread trend toward later ages at first marriage for women. The reasons for the essentially horizontal trend in polygyny are the age structure effects resulting from accelerations of population growth and the increase in age at first marriage for men. In other words, the age gap between spouses has not undergone a fundamental change and polygyny is not being "squeezed out" by any significant convergence of the ages at first marriage for the two sexes. If we recall what Goode had to say in 1963 (p. 188),

It seems unlikely that in the new nation-states emerging in Africa the generally favourable attitudes of African men toward polygyny will be changed quickly. Even so, it will, without question, eventually almost completely disappear as a pattern of behaviour. The new legal codes are gradually moving towards its abolition, women will avoid it where they can, and men will not generally be able to afford it.

then, the conclusion seems to be that men above ages 25 or 30 have been remarkably successful in maintaining their old prerogatives during the post-colonial period. In short, the evolution of the polygyny and age difference indicators provides no real support for the Westernization hypothesis to date.

The analysis of marriage and fertility in Lesotho and Botswana by Ian Timaeus and Wendy Graham (chapter 8) yields important insights on the evolution of these demographic factors in situations that are heavily conditioned by labor migration for both sexes. Marriages have become very late for men and women alike, large proportions of women never formally marry, widow remarriage is much less common than elsewhere in Africa, and households permanently headed by women have become a dominant trait. In these areas, Christian churches are strong and female literacy levels are among the highest on the continent. Despite the presence of such cultural props for the Westernization effect, domestic situations for women have become increasingly complex and varied, both in cross-sections and longitudinally. If the time a woman spends with a husband in a nuclear household is any indication of conjugality, then few person-years are spent in such conditions. The weakening of the traditional marriage pattern, which was not significantly different from that of other eastern and southern African patrilineal populations with a mixed agricultural and livestock economy, has led mainly to a longer reliance by women on their own kinship group, to greater self-reliance and subsequently to reliance on support from children, rather than to reliance on husbands. Labor migration is of major importance in many other African areas as well, and its association with marriage retardation implies that the changes in ages at first marriage should not be interpreted automatically as a sign of the coming of the conjugal family.

The last issue with direct connections to the Goode and Caldwell theses

concerns child-fosterage. This topic is studied by Hilary Page at the macro level in chapter 9 and by Caroline Bledsoe and Uche Isiugo-Abanihe at the micro level in chapter 10. Page essentially measures the current incidence of child-fosterage with the WFS household data on the presence of own and other children. Her measurements thus pertain to "in-fostering" and not to "out-fostering." Bledsoe and Abanihe describe both ends of a particular form of child-fosterage, namely fosterage of young children by "grannies," together with its rationale and implications. As Caldwell remarked (see the preceding quotation), the conjugal family is characterized not only by close ties between husband and wife, but also by the concept of concentrating concern and expenditure on one's own children. African societies are, however, renowned for their stress of children as the human capital of lineages, and this has resulted in the socialization of new members by many agents other than the biological parents. Witness thereof is the distinction anthropologists had to make between pater and genitor, along with the role of East African age grades, the function of maternal uncles in matrilineal societies, circulation of children as domestic labor, or the "grannie" pattern. African child circulation is typical for a situation in which the wealth flow between generations has not been reversed since the present or anticipated economic benefits from children are at the core of child circulation. Child circulation creates a web of rights and obligations between the biological and foster parent(s), as is eloquently shown in chapter 10. Furthermore, fosterage is a means of spreading the costs and benefits of children much more widely than is possible in the nuclear family system. New patterns of fosterage centering on education involve exporting the costs of rural fertility to urban settings at certain ages, or the other way around at other stages of the child's life cycle. But the outcome is still that such cost devolution is to be matched by a transfer of rights to current or prospective child benefits. Finally, judging from Page's data, child circulation is not something restricted to a few areas or to the past; it is much more widespread than anticipated by Western social scientists. The picture emerging from these two chapters is that the current situation seems far removed from the close parent-child dyad fostered by Western ideals and from the "Eurasian model" involving two or three biologically related generations.

Last but not least, this book also contains chapters on two classic topics in African demography. Chapter 7, by Pebley and Mbugua, reassesses the impact of polygyny on fertility, and the second, by Larsen, considers trends and social differentials with respect to sterility. Both studies use the most recent information provided by the World Fertility Surveys for updating earlier insights gathered from more scattered information. Pebley and Mbugua show, for instance, that the polygyny-fertility link is a multistranded one involving compensating and reinforcing effects operating through the intermediate fertility variables. As such they leave little room for an overly simplified

theory involving just one dominant mechanism. Chapter 4, by Larsen, on sterility also shows that easy extrapolations may be misleading. Until now, it was commonly believed that antibiotics have been able to reduce sterility levels, especially in the high sterility belt of Central Africa. Larsen finds, however, that sterility levels in Cameroon and Northern Sudan are surprisingly invariant across cohorts and over recent decades and that sterility even increased in Kenya during the 1960s and 1970s. This chapter calls attention to the problem of all sexually transmitted diseases in sub-Saharan Africa, and establishes, in view of the current and almost exclusive preoccupation with AIDS, that the older scourges of venereal disease still have not been brought under control, despite the existence of a cure. The persistence of sexually transmitted diseases in many areas of the continent shows that Western-style conjugal marriage and the concomitant limitation of extramarital sexual behavior will take much longer to take root in Africa than was assumed by the sociological theories of the 1960s.

The concluding chapter goes beyond a critique of the Westernization hypothesis of family change and fertility transition. In its first part we explore Ester Boserup's proposition (1985) that a fertility transition could also be triggered off by the realization that expectations with respect to enhanced personal welfare and high returns to parents or community from greater investment in the education of children may not materialize. Two responses are possible: either investments in children drop and fertility remains unaltered, which is the continuation of or a return to an earlier situation, or investments are concentrated in a smaller number of children. Given the current heterogeneity of the continent with respect to economic trends and the recurrence of politically or ecologically induced disasters, both responses are likely to emerge depending on the region. But if fertility drops (and there is some evidence that a decline has started in the Kenyan Central Province, for instance) such a transition could conceivably level off at average parities that are still well above two or three children (see Cain, 1983; Bongaarts, 1986). As documented in this volume, many of the props for much higher than replacement fertility are likely to survive in sub-Saharan Africa. Moreover, we are not at all sure that family changes are occurring on the road traced by Goode or Caldwell. It seems rather that African populations are currently producing their own versions of new systems that are still far from being fully crystallized. But, as argued in the second half of the concluding chapter, this does not imply that there is at present no need for greater family planning effort. African leaders themselves have now realized, at least in political forums, that current population growth rates aggravate the economic and ecological crises, and that, in the face of reduced child-spacing through traditional means, contraception is required to restore the balance. Furthermore, African societies are not totally unarmed to meet this challenge. Many of them have a long tradition of communal solidarity which

finds its expression in the existence of associations of various sorts. These associations, and particularly the women's groups, have on occasion been capable of addressing new problems and adopting their functions, most notably to include income-generating activities and initiatives concerning health care and social welfare in general. Although there are reasons for being cautious about the possibilities of such networks, we still feel that their potential in the fields of primary health care and family planning is undervalued. We therefore hope that the record for the 1980s and 1990s will show, as has happened in the past in other societies, that African communal solidarity too can be instrumental in solving the current demographic challenge.

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Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: University of California Press
• Date d'édition: 1989
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0520063635
• ISBN 13: 9780520063631
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 556
• Éditeur: Lestaeghe Ron J., Lesthaeghe Ron J.
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
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