Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory) - Couverture souple

Robert C., Koons

 
9780521100595: Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction and Decision Theory)
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 0521100593 ISBN 13 : 9780521100595
Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 2009

Synopsis

The purpose of this book is to develop a framework for analyzing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents, and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory, and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox (known since antiquity as "the Liar paradox") lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, Gaifman, and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of Liar-like paradoxes, including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxial statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides a new understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices, and institutions.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

The purpose of this book is to develop a framework for analyzing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents, and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory, and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox (known since antiquity as "the Liar paradox") lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, Gaifman, and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of Liar-like paradoxes, including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxial statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides a new understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices, and institutions.

Présentation de l'éditeur

This book develops a framework for analysing strategic rationality, a notion central to contemporary game theory, which is the formal study of the interaction of rational agents and which has proved extremely fruitful in economics, political theory and business management. The author argues that a logical paradox lies at the root of a number of persistent puzzles in game theory, in particular those concerning rational agents who seek to establish some kind of reputation. Building on the work of Parsons, Burge, Gaifman and Barwise and Etchemendy, Robert Koons constructs a context-sensitive solution to the whole family of liar-like paradoxes including, for the first time, a detailed account of how the interpretation of paradoxical statements is fixed by context. This analysis provides an understanding of how the rational agent model can account for the emergence of rules, practices and institutions.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
Cambridge University Press
Date d'édition
2009
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
0521100593
ISBN 13 
9780521100595
Reliure
Broché
Numéro d'édition
1
Nombre de pages
192
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
Avery
https://www.avery.fr/

chemin des peupliers 27
Dardilly
France

Autres éditions populaires du même titre

9780521412698: Paradoxes of Belief and Strategic Rationality

Edition présentée

ISBN 10 :  0521412692 ISBN 13 :  9780521412698
Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 1992
Couverture rigide