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Description du livre Hardcover. Etat : Bon. Légères traces d'usure sur la couverture. Couverture différente. Edition 1984. Ammareal reverse jusqu'à 15% du prix net de cet article à des organisations caritatives. ENGLISH DESCRIPTION Book Condition: Used, Good. Slight signs of wear on the cover. Different cover. Edition 1984. Ammareal gives back up to 15% of this item's net price to charity organizations. N° de réf. du vendeur D-920-246
Description du livre Etat : Very Good. Ships from the UK. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in excellent condition. May show signs of wear or have minor defects. N° de réf. du vendeur 15967294-20
Description du livre Etat : Good. Ships from the UK. Former library book; may include library markings. Used book that is in clean, average condition without any missing pages. N° de réf. du vendeur 614856-20
Description du livre Etat : Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has hardback covers. In good all round condition. No dust jacket. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,600grams, ISBN:0521257441. N° de réf. du vendeur 9157706
Description du livre Hardcover. Etat : Good. No Jacket. ix, 238 p. N° de réf. du vendeur GU3712
Description du livre Gebundene Ausgabe. Etat : Gut. 256 Seiten Exemplar aus einer wissenchaftlichen Bibliothek Altersfreigabe FSK ab 0 Jahre Sprache: Englisch Gewicht in Gramm: 550. N° de réf. du vendeur 360008
Description du livre Hardcover. Etat : Fine. Etat de la jaquette : Fine. 1st Edition. ix, 238 pp. Original cloth. Some neat ink underlining on pp. 2-7, 9, else Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. Out of print in cloth; in print in paperback at US$43.00. Edmund S. Phelps: Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2006, 'for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy.' 'Last but not least, positing rational expectations equilibrium is not just inaccurate as a way to close the model in the same sense as postulating rational choice is taken to be inaccurate: It is inappropriate to impose on the model. In a highly innovative economy and thus one subject to change, firms even firms in the same industry and location are all thinking differently. So a firm would have no grounds to reason, as it implicitly does in rational-expectations theory, that 'since I have calculated I must raise my wages by x percent, I should now take into account that my competitors are planning to do the same; so I must now adjust my wage increase even more .' This kind of inductive reasoning to arrive at the right expectations is inapplicable. That is the thesis of my piece (Phelps, 1983) in the Frydman-Phelps volume [offered here]' (Phelps, 'Macroeconomics for a Modern Economy', Nobel Lecture, Dec. 8, 2006). Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps; 2. The trouble with 'rational expectations' and the problem of inflation stabilization Edmund S. Phelps; Comment Phillip Cagan; 3. Expectations of others' expectations and the transitional nonneutrality of fully believed systematic monetary policy Juan Carlos Di Tata; Comment Clive Bull; 4. The stability of rational expectations in macroeconomic models George Evans; Comment Guillermo A. Calvo; 5. Individual rationality, decentralization, and the rational expectations hypothesis Roman Frydman; 6. Convergence to rational expectations equilibrium Margaret Bray; Comment Roy Radner; 7. A distinction between the unconditional expectational equilibrium and the rational expectations equilibrium Roman Frydman; 8. On mistaken beliefs and resultant equilibria Alan Kirman; Comment Jerry Green; 9. Equilibrium theory with learning and disparate expectations: some issues and methods Robert M. Townsend; Comment John B. Taylor; 10. Keynesianism, monetarism, and rational expectations: some reflections and conjectures Axel Leijonhufvud; Comment Frank Hahn; Index. N° de réf. du vendeur 18356
Description du livre Hardcover. Etat : Fine. Etat de la jaquette : Fine. 1st Edition. ix, 238 pp. Original cloth. Signature of former owner on front flyleaf, else Near Fine, in near fine dust jacket. Out of print in cloth; in print in paperback at US$43.00. Edmund S. Phelps: Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel, 2006, 'for his analysis of intertemporal tradeoffs in macroeconomic policy.' 'Last but not least, positing rational expectations equilibrium is not just inaccurate as a way to close the model in the same sense as postulating rational choice is taken to be inaccurate: It is inappropriate to impose on the model. In a highly innovative economy and thus one subject to change, firms even firms in the same industry and location are all thinking differently. So a firm would have no grounds to reason, as it implicitly does in rational-expectations theory, that 'since I have calculated I must raise my wages by x percent, I should now take into account that my competitors are planning to do the same; so I must now adjust my wage increase even more .' This kind of inductive reasoning to arrive at the right expectations is inapplicable. That is the thesis of my piece (Phelps, 1983) in the Frydman-Phelps volume [offered here]' (Phelps, 'Macroeconomics for a Modern Economy', Nobel Lecture, Dec. 8, 2006). Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction Roman Frydman and Edmund S. Phelps; 2. The trouble with 'rational expectations' and the problem of inflation stabilization Edmund S. Phelps; Comment Phillip Cagan; 3. Expectations of others' expectations and the transitional nonneutrality of fully believed systematic monetary policy Juan Carlos Di Tata; Comment Clive Bull; 4. The stability of rational expectations in macroeconomic models George Evans; Comment Guillermo A. Calvo; 5. Individual rationality, decentralization, and the rational expectations hypothesis Roman Frydman; 6. Convergence to rational expectations equilibrium Margaret Bray; Comment Roy Radner; 7. A distinction between the unconditional expectational equilibrium and the rational expectations equilibrium Roman Frydman; 8. On mistaken beliefs and resultant equilibria Alan Kirman; Comment Jerry Green; 9. Equilibrium theory with learning and disparate expectations: some issues and methods Robert M. Townsend; Comment John B. Taylor; 10. Keynesianism, monetarism, and rational expectations: some reflections and conjectures Axel Leijonhufvud; Comment Frank Hahn; Index. N° de réf. du vendeur 18374