Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining - Couverture rigide

 
9780521267571: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining
Couverture rigide
ISBN 10 : 0521267579 ISBN 13 : 9780521267571
Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 1985

Synopsis

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining provides a comprehensive picture of the new developments in bargaining theory. It especially shows the way the use of axiomatic models has been complemented by the new results derived from strategic models. The papers in this volume are edited versions of those given at a conference on Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining held at the University of Pittsburgh. There are two distinct reasons why the study of bargaining is of fundamental importance in economics. The first is that many aspects of economic activity are directly influenced by bargaining between and among individuals, firms, and nations. The second is that bargaining occupies an important place in economic theory, since the 'pure bargaining problem' is at the opposite pole of economic phenomena from the case of 'perfect competition'. This volume is an outgrowth of the renewed interest in the strategic approach to the theory of bargaining and to the general theory of non-cooperative games.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
Cambridge University Press
Date d'édition
1985
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
0521267579
ISBN 13 
9780521267571
Reliure
Relié
Nombre de pages
404
Éditeur
Roth Alvin E.
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
Avery
https://www.avery.fr/

chemin des peupliers 27
Dardilly
France

Autres éditions populaires du même titre

9780521022743: Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining

Edition présentée

ISBN 10 :  0521022746 ISBN 13 :  9780521022743
Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 2008
Couverture souple