Articles liés à Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Synopsis
Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Présentation de l'éditeur
Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centres on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation.
Revue de presse
"...the most serious and most productive application of the formal game theory to the study of deterrence and the outbreak of war...this is the first book-length treatment I have seen that makes successful use of game theory in exploring the most elusive aspects of this subject." Thomas Schelling, author of The Strategy of Conflict
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
- ÉditeurCambridge University Press
- Date d'édition1990
- ISBN 10 0521375274
- ISBN 13 9780521375276
- ReliureRelié
- Langueanglais
- Nombre de pages240
Acheter neuf
Afficher cet article
EUR 96,25
EUR 4,73 expédition depuis Royaume-Uni vers France
Destinations, frais et délais
Résultats de recherche pour Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Image d'archives
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Ancien ou d'occasion
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : Phatpocket Limited, Waltham Abbey, HERTS, Royaume-Uni
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
Etat : Good. Your purchase helps support Sri Lankan Children's Charity 'The Rainbow Centre'. Ex-library, so some stamps and wear, but in good overall condition. Our donations to The Rainbow Centre have helped provide an education and a safe haven to hundreds of children who live in appalling conditions. N° de réf. du vendeur Z1-C-084-03927
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Image d'archives
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : Ria Christie Collections, Uxbridge, Royaume-Uni
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
Etat : New. In. N° de réf. du vendeur ria9780521375276_new
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Image fournie par le vendeur
Nuclear deterrence theory : the search for credibility / Robert Powell
Edité par
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Ancien ou d'occasion
Couverture rigide
Edition originale
Vendeur : MW Books, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
First Edition. Fine cloth copy in a near-fine, very slightly edge-nicked and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description: viii, 230 pages; 21cm. Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.Subjects: Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear energy Political aspects. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Dissuasion (Stratégie)Guerre nucléaire. nuclear wars. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Deterrence. AbschreckungAtomstrategie. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear weapons. Deterrence. International peace and security.Nuclear power Political aspects 1 Kg. N° de réf. du vendeur 383753
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Image fournie par le vendeur
Nuclear deterrence theory : the search for credibility / Robert Powell
Edité par
Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Ancien ou d'occasion
Couverture rigide
Edition originale
Vendeur : MW Books Ltd., Galway, Irlande
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
First Edition. Fine cloth copy in a near-fine, very slightly edge-nicked and dust-dulled dust-wrapper, now mylar-sleeved. Remains particularly well-preserved overall; tight, bright, clean and strong. Physical description: viii, 230 pages; 21cm. Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.Subjects: Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear energy Political aspects. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Dissuasion (Stratégie)Guerre nucléaire. nuclear wars. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Deterrence (Strategy)Nuclear warfare. Nuclear Weapons. Nuclear Deterrence. AbschreckungAtomstrategie. Deterrence (Strategy). Nuclear warfare.Nuclear weapons. Deterrence. International peace and security.Nuclear power Political aspects 1 Kg. N° de réf. du vendeur 383753
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Image d'archives
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Edité par
Cambridge Univ Pr, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
Hardcover. Etat : Brand New. 238 pages. 9.50x6.25x1.00 inches. In Stock. This item is printed on demand. N° de réf. du vendeur __0521375274
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Image fournie par le vendeur
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, 2005
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Évaluation du vendeur 4 sur 5 étoiles
Etat : New. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory.InhaltsverzeichnisPreface 1. Introduction 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility 3. N° de réf. du vendeur 446933366
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Image d'archives
Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9780521375276
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Image d'archives
Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Hardcover)
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : AussieBookSeller, Truganina, VIC, Australie
Évaluation du vendeur 3 sur 5 étoiles
Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centers on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation. By providing an analytic framework in which questions about nuclear deterrence may be asked more precisely and the consequences of different strategies explored more extensively, the book provides a foundation for further advances in deterrence theory.An appendix offers the nonspecialist an introduction to game theory and to the models the author develops in the text. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521375276
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Image d'archives
Nuclear Deterrence Theory
Edité par
Cambridge University Press CUP, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : Books Puddle, New York, NY, Etats-Unis
Évaluation du vendeur 4 sur 5 étoiles
Etat : New. pp. 240 Index. N° de réf. du vendeur 26486657
Quantité disponible : 4 disponible(s)
Image d'archives
Nuclear Deterrence Theory (Hardcover)
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990
ISBN 10 : 0521375274
ISBN 13 : 9780521375276
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : CitiRetail, Stevenage, Royaume-Uni
Évaluation du vendeur 5 sur 5 étoiles
Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to explore some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory, including the effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in the international system on the dynamics of escalation. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrrent strategies that have evolved in response to the nuclear revolution and the condition of mutually assured destruction: the strategy of limited retaliation. The author argues that the logic underlying both strategies centers on a search for ways to make the use of force or the threat of its use credible when any use of force might escalate to mutual devastation. By providing an analytic framework in which questions about nuclear deterrence may be asked more precisely and the consequences of different strategies explored more extensively, the book provides a foundation for further advances in deterrence theory.An appendix offers the nonspecialist an introduction to game theory and to the models the author develops in the text. Applying advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, Robert Powell examines the foundations of deterrence theory. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521375276
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)