Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination - Couverture rigide

Currie, David; Levine, Paul

 
9780521441964: Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination

Synopsis

This book addresses a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

In this book David Currie and Paul Levine address a broad range of issues concerning the design and conduct of macroeconomic policy in open economies. Adopting neo-Keynesian models for which monetary and fiscal policy have short-term real effects, they analyse active stabilisation policies in both a single- and multi-country context. Questions addressed include: the merits of simple policy rules, policy design in the face of uncertainty and international policy coordination. A central feature of the book is the treatment of credibility and the effect of a policy-maker's reputation for sticking to announced policies. These considerations are integrated with coordination issues to produce a unique synthesis. The volume develops optimal control methods and dynamic game theory to handle relationships between governments and a conscious rational private sector and produces a unified, coherent approach to the subject. This book will be of interest to students and teachers of open economy macroeconomics and to professional economists interested in using macroeconomic models to design policy.

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Autres éditions populaires du même titre

9780521104609: Rules, Reputation and Macroeconomic Policy Coordination

Edition présentée

ISBN 10 :  0521104602 ISBN 13 :  9780521104609
Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 2009
Couverture souple