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Synopsis
Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.
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Présentation de l'éditeur
Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula.
Revue de presse
'The Sanctions Paradox is one of the best books written in the field of international political economy during the 1990s. It offers a simple but clever theory that explains when states are likely to employ economic sanctions and when they are likely to work. Since sanctions seem destined to remain a favourite tool of statecraft in the 21st century, this book is likely to be paid serious attention for years to come.' John Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations)
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Cambridge University Press, 1999
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HARDCOVER. Etat : Fair. No dust jacket. All 3 edges of text block have 2 inch blocks of black marker, also small block of marker on fly page. Fly page has a small skinned patch. Spine has small sticker shadow. Binding solid, pages crisp and clean, highlighting on pages 1-5. Green boards have a few scuffs. Extremities lightly bumped with minimal tip wear. N° de réf. du vendeur SKU1006717
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65)
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Cambridge University Press, 1999
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations
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Cambridge Univ Pr, 1999
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The Sanctions Paradox
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Cambridge University Press, 2013
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Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? This 1999 book argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where . N° de réf. du vendeur 446943529
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521643325
ISBN 13 : 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox (Hardcover)
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Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from our Sydney, NSW warehouse or from our UK or US warehouse, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox (Hardcover)
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Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521643325
ISBN 13 : 9780521643320
Neuf
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Vendeur : CitiRetail, Stevenage, Royaume-Uni
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (Cambridge Studies in International Relations, Series Number 65)
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521643325
ISBN 13 : 9780521643320
Neuf
Couverture rigide
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The Sanctions Paradox : Economic Statecraft and International Relations
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521643325
ISBN 13 : 9780521643320
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
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Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This 1999 book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521643320
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The Sanctions Paradox (Hardcover)
Edité par
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999
ISBN 10 : 0521643325
ISBN 13 : 9780521643320
Neuf
Couverture rigide
Vendeur : Grand Eagle Retail, Mason, OH, Etats-Unis
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. Despite their increasing importance, there is little theoretical understanding of why nation-states initiate economic sanctions, or what determines their success. This book argues that both imposers and targets of economic coercion incorporate expectations of future conflict as well as the short-run opportunity costs of coercion into their behaviour. Drezner argues that conflict expectations have a paradoxical effect. Adversaries will impose sanctions frequently, but rarely secure concessions. Allies will be reluctant to use coercion, but once sanctions are used, they can result in significant concessions. Ironically, the most favourable distribution of payoffs is likely to result when the imposer cares the least about its reputation or the distribution of gains. The book's argument is pursued using game theory and statistical analysis, and detailed case studies of Russia's relations with newly-independent states, and US efforts to halt nuclear proliferation on the Korean peninsula. The conventional wisdom is that economic sanctions do not work in international affairs. If so, why do countries wield them so often? Daniel Drezner argues that, paradoxically, countries are most likely to be willing to use sanctions under conditions where they will produce the feeblest results. Shipping may be from multiple locations in the US or from the UK, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521643320
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