An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.
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'The theory of deterrence formed the foundation of American grand strategy during the decades of the Cold War. It is a deeply flawed theory both in terms of logical rigor and consistency with the historical record. Frank C. Zagare and Marc Kilgour convincingly demonstrate the weaknesses of classical deterrence theory and then proceed to develop a new, elegant, game theoretic treatment of all forms of deterrence. Perfect Deterrence Theory explains both why and when credible threats matter. It offers a comprehensive view of deterrence that is neither limited to nuclear weapons nor to conventional weapons, but spans all deterrent circumstances. The authors write in such a lucid style and the modeling is so accessible that this book is bound to influence scholarship and foreign policy strategizing for years to come. Perfect Deterrence is a superb examination of one of the most important foreign policy problems of our time.' Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Hoover Institution for War and Peace, Stanford University
'Perfect Deterrence is the most insightful and comprehensive book on modern deterrence theory ever written. It is also amazingly accessible. I can't imagine teaching a graduate or advanced undergraduate course in either international relations or security without it.' George Downs, New York University
An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. This book provides the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War, offering a new approach to its assumptions, and analyzing them using game theory. Drawing on numerous historical examples, the authors' analysis provides a new understanding of threats and responses, and yields some surprising conclusions. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521781749
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