Articles liés à Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy

Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy - Couverture souple

Livre 20 sur 96: Cambridge Studies in International Relations

Schultz, Kenneth

 
9780521796699: Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy
Couverture souple
ISBN 10 : 0521796695 ISBN 13 : 9780521796699
Editeur : Cambridge University Press, 2009

Synopsis

In this book, first published in 2001, Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Présentation de l'éditeur

In this book, first published in 2001, Kenneth Schultz explores the effects of democratic politics on the use and success of coercive diplomacy. He argues that open political competition between the government and opposition parties influences the decision to use threats in international crises, how rival states interpret those threats, and whether or not crises can be settled short of war. The relative transparency of their political processes means that, while democratic governments cannot easily conceal domestic constraints against using force, they can also credibly demonstrate resolve when their threats enjoy strong domestic support. As a result, compared to their non-democratic counterparts, democracies are more selective about making threats, but those they do make are more likely to be successful - that is, to gain a favorable outcome without resort to war. Schultz develops his argument through a series of game-theoretic models and tests the resulting hypothesis using both statistical analyses and historical case studies.

Revue de presse

'It is always a pleasure to read a book with such a broad scope and possible important consequences not only for political theory, but also practice as the one written so intelligently by Kenneth Schultz. ... It will ... be very useful for anyone working and dealing with international security issues; and perhaps, it would provoke others to further and elaborate the issues stirred up by Schultz's research.' Emilian Kavalski, Global Review of Ethnopolitics

Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

Éditeur
Cambridge University Press
Date d'édition
2009
Langue
anglais
ISBN 10 
0521796695
ISBN 13 
9780521796699
Reliure
Broché
Nombre de pages
324
Coordonnées du fabricant
non disponible
Personne responsable
Avery
https://www.avery.fr/

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