This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally.
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Joshua Gert is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Florida State University. He has published in a number of philosophical journals including American Philosophical Quarterly, Ethics and Noûs.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Etat : New. This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Num Pages: 246 pages, black & white illustrations, colour line drawings, diagrams. BIC Classification: HPCF5; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 216 x 138 x 17. Weight in Grams: 460. . 2004. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . N° de réf. du vendeur V9780521833189
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Etat : New. This book presents an account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Series: Cambridge Studies in Philosophy. Num Pages: 246 pages, black & white illustrations, colour line drawings, diagrams. BIC Classification: HPCF5; HPQ. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational. Dimension: 216 x 138 x 17. Weight in Grams: 460. . 2004. Illustrated. hardcover. . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. N° de réf. du vendeur V9780521833189
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Hardcover. Etat : new. Hardcover. This book presents a new account of normative practical reasons and the way in which they contribute to the rationality of action. Rather than simply 'counting in favour of' actions, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. The distinction between these two roles explains why some reasons do not seem relevant to the rational status of an action unless the agent cares about them, while other reasons retain all their force regardless of the agent's attitude. It also explains why the class of rationally permissible action is wide enough to contain not only all morally required action, but also much selfish and immoral action. The book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular, and moral theory more generally. In this book, Joshua Gert argues that rather than simply 'counting in favour of' action, normative reasons play two logically distinct roles: requiring action and justifying action. His book will appeal to a range of readers interested in practical reason in particular and moral theory more generally. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780521833189
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