Direct Reference: From Language to Thought - Couverture rigide

Recanati, Francois

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0631181547 ISBN 13 : 9780631181545

Editeur : Blackwell Publishers, 1993

Synopsis

In this book Professor Recanati sets out to defend and systematize the much-discussed "theory of direct reference", according to which the contribution made by a referential term, (for example, a proper name or a demonstrative) to the proposition expressed by the sentence where it occurs is its reference. To deal with the objections traditionally levelled against that theory, he puts forward a general account of "de re" thoughts and communication which blends insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions. In the second part of the book, recent advances in pragmatics are presented and used to shed light on the referential/attributive distinction (with respect to both definite descriptions and indexicals) and belief reports. New treatments of some of the major topics in the philosophy of mind and language are offered along the way.

A propos du livre

Quatrième de couverture

This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language. It is the ideal introduction to the subject of direct reference for advanced undergraduates and graduates, looking to explore some of the major topics in language and thought being discussed today.

Présentation de l'éditeur

This volume puts forward a distinct new theory of direct reference, blending insights from both the Fregean and the Russellian traditions, and fitting the general theory of language understanding used by those working on the pragmatics of natural language

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Blackwell Publishers
• Date d'édition: 1993
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0631181547
• ISBN 13: 9780631181545
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 416
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: non disponible