Aristotle on Moral Responsibility: Character and Cause - Couverture rigide

Meyer, Susan Sauve

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0631185275 ISBN 13 : 9780631185277

Editeur : Blackwell Publishers, 1993

Synopsis

What makes an agent subject to moral expectations and evaluations, and what makes such an agent subject to moral evaluation for particular things he or she does? In this book, Sauve Meyer sets out to illuminate Aristotle's response to these central questions of ethics. Contrary to those who think moral responsibility is a peculiarly modern notion, Sauve Meyer shows that Aristotle's discussions of voluntariness are concerned with the central questions addressed by a theory of moral responsibility. In his view, Aristotle's conception of moral responsibility is a sophisticated philosophical theory capable of solving most of the problems that a theory of moral responsibility must address. Sauve Meyer then explains how the theory of moral responsibility Aristotle develops differs from modern accounts. While Aristotle does not require responsibility for character, or require that moral agency be an exception to the type of causation at work in the rest of the natural world, his view is not vulnerable to familiar anti-naturalist and incompatibilist criticisms. In his view, the causal notions to which Aristotle appeals allow him to articulate and defend the special causal status we assign to the moral agent, without locating such agency outside the natural world.

A propos du livre

Présentation de l'éditeur

This is a reissue, with new introduction, of Susan Sauvé Meyer's 1993 book, in which she presents a comprehensive examination of Aristotle's accounts of voluntariness in the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics. She makes the case that these constitute a theory of moral responsibility--albeit one with important differences from modern theories. Highlights of the discussion include a reconstruction of the dialectical argument in the Eudemian Ethics II 6-9, and a demonstration that the definitions of 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' in Nicomachean Ethics III 1 are the culmination of that argument. By identifying the paradigms of voluntariness and involuntariness that Aristotle begins with and the opponents (most notably Plato) he addresses, Meyer explains notoriously puzzling features of the Nicomachean account--such as Aristotle's requirement that involuntary agents experience pain or regret. Other familiar features of Aristotle's account are cast in a new light. That we are responsible for the characters we develop turns out not to be a necessary condition of responsible agency. That voluntary action has its "origin" in the agent and that our actions are "up to us to do and not to do"--often interpreted as implying a libertarian conception of agency--turn out to be perfectly compatible with causal determinism, a point Meyer makes by locating these locutions in the context of Aristotle's general understanding of causality. While Aristotle does not himself face or address worries that determinism is incompatible with responsibility, his causal repertoire provides the resources for a powerful response to incompatibilist arguments. On this and other fronts Aristotle's is a view to be taken seriously by theorists of moral responsibility.

Revue de presse

Review from previous edition ingenious, learned, original, and an important contribution to important debates: about how we see ethics, about how we see Aristotle, and about how we see ourselves. (Mind)

This is a fine book. It is clearly written, carefully argued, and illuminates both Aristotle and the topic of moral responsibility. (Ethics)

Meyer has produced a book that teems with lucid analyses of important Aristotelian concepts and casts a clarifying light on many an obscure passage. It will richly repay the careful study that it will certainly provoke. (Phronesis)

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Blackwell Publishers
• Date d'édition: 1993
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0631185275
• ISBN 13: 9780631185277
• Reliure: Relié
• Nombre de pages: 216
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: non disponible