Everyone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph L. Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language can be classified as valid or invalid.
To the extent that philosophers have addressed this issue at all, they take it for granted that confusion is a kind of ambiguity. Camp rejects this notion; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning. Camp proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science.Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Joseph L. Camp, Jr., was Professor of Philosophy and Fellow of the Center for Philosophy of Science at the University of Pittsburgh.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : California Books, Miami, FL, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. N° de réf. du vendeur I-9780674015913
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Antiquariaat Ovidius, Bredevoort, Pays-Bas
Etat : Gebraucht / Used. Fine state. d606e. N° de réf. du vendeur 75504
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Anybook.com, Lincoln, Royaume-Uni
Etat : Good. This is an ex-library book and may have the usual library/used-book markings inside.This book has soft covers. In good all round condition. Please note the Image in this listing is a stock photo and may not match the covers of the actual item,450grams, ISBN:9780674015913. N° de réf. du vendeur 9493853
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : Brand New. 246 pages. 9.00x6.00x0.75 inches. In Stock. N° de réf. du vendeur x-0674015916
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Taschenbuch. Etat : Neu. Neuware - Everyone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph L. Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language can be classified as valid or invalid.To the extent that philosophers have addressed this issue at all, they take it for granted that confusion is a kind of ambiguity. Camp rejects this notion; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning. Camp proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780674015913
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Etat : New. Camp rejects the philosophical conceit that confusion is a kind of ambiguity his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. He proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications . N° de réf. du vendeur 594870722
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : CitiRetail, Stevenage, Royaume-Uni
Paperback. Etat : new. Paperback. Everyone has mistaken one thing for another, such as a stranger for an acquaintance. A person who has mistaken two things, Joseph Camp argues, even on a massive scale, is still capable of logical thought. In order to make that idea precise, one needs a logic of confused thought that is blind to the distinction between the objects that have been confused. Confused thought and language cannot be characterized as true or false even though reasoning conducted in such language can be classified as valid or invalid.To the extent that philosophers have addressed this issue at all, they take it for granted that confusion is a kind of ambiguity. Camp rejects this notion; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. To attribute confusion to someone is to take up a paternalistic stance in evaluating his reasoning. Camp proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science. Camp rejects the philosophical conceit that confusion is a kind of ambiguity; his fundamental claim is that confusion is not a mental state. He proposes a novel characterization of confusion, and then demonstrates its fruitfulness with several applications in the history of philosophy and the history of science. This item is printed on demand. Shipping may be from our UK warehouse or from our Australian or US warehouses, depending on stock availability. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780674015913
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : SHIMEDIA, Brooklyn, NY, Etats-Unis
Etat : New. Satisfaction Guaranteed or your money back. N° de réf. du vendeur 0674015916
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)