Truth and Objectivity - Couverture rigide

Wright, Crispin

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0674910869 ISBN 13 : 9780674910867

Editeur : Harvard University Press, 1993

Synopsis

Philosophy, for all its seeking after truth, must endlessly grapple with questions about the nature and status of truth. Is there, for example, such a thing as fully objective truth, or is our talk of "truth" merely a projection onto the work of what we find acceptable in moral argument, scientific theory, mathematical discourse? Such questions are at the centre of "Truth and Objectivity", which offers an original viewpoint on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. Crispin Wright proposes a new framework for the discussion of the claims of the realists, who think of truth as fully objective, and the anti-realists, who do not. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgements, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. The real issues that must be resolved if the appropriateness of realist and anti-realist intuitions about a range of judgements is to be properly appraised are different, and are here developed in detail from a radically new perspective. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, truth and "correspondence to fact", the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs, anti-realism about content, and the "quietism" about this whole tradition of debate favoured by some philosophers of Wittgensteinian sympathies.

A propos du livre

Présentation de l'éditeur

Crispin Wright offers an original perspective on the place of "realism" in philosophical inquiry. He proposes a radically new framework for discussing the claims of the realists and the anti-realists. This framework rejects the classical "deflationary" conception of truth yet allows both disputants to respect the intuition that judgments, whose status they contest, are at least semantically fitted for truth and may often justifiably be regarded as true. In the course of his argument, Wright offers original critical discussions of many central concerns of philosophers interested in realism, including the "deflationary" conception of truth, internal realist truth, scientific realism and the theoreticity of observation, and the role of moral states of affairs in explanations of moral beliefs.

Biographie de l'auteur

Crispin Wright is Leverhulme Research Professor and Bishop Wardlaw Professor at the University of St. Andrews and is Global Distinguished Professor at New York University.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Harvard University Press
• Date d'édition: 1993
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0674910869
• ISBN 13: 9780674910867
• Reliure: Relié
• Numéro d'édition: 1
• Nombre de pages: 262
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: Amazon EU Sarl; 0; www.amazon.com; ; 38 Avenue John F. Kennedy; Luxembourg; 0; L-1855; Luxembourg