Game theory, the formalized study of strategy, began in the 1940s by asking how emotionless geniuses should play games, but ignored until recently how average people with emotions and limited foresight actually play games. This book marks the first substantial and authoritative effort to close this gap. Colin Camerer, one of the field's leading figures, uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning, which help predict what real people and companies do in strategic situations. Unifying a wealth of information from ongoing studies in strategic behavior, he takes the experimental science of behavioral economics a major step forward. He does so in lucid, friendly prose.
Behavioral game theory has three ingredients that come clearly into focus in this book: mathematical theories of how moral obligation and vengeance affect the way people bargain and trust each other; a theory of how limits in the brain constrain the number of steps of "I think he thinks . . ." reasoning people naturally do; and a theory of how people learn from experience to make better strategic decisions. Strategic interactions that can be explained by behavioral game theory include bargaining, games of bluffing as in sports and poker, strikes, how conventions help coordinate a joint activity, price competition and patent races, and building up reputations for trustworthiness or ruthlessness in business or life. While there are many books on standard game theory that address the way ideally rational actors operate, Behavioral Game Theory stands alone in blending experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is must reading for anyone who seeks a more complete understanding of strategic thinking, from professional economists to scholars and students of economics, management studies, psychology, political science, anthropology, and biology.Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Colin F. Camerer is Rea A. and Lela G. Axline Professor of Business Economics at the California Institute of Technology. The author of numerous journal articles and book chapters, he teaches both cognitive psychology and economics.
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
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Encuadernación de tapa dura. Etat : Bien. Princeton University Press, 2003. Texto en inglés. 550 pp. 24 x 17. Tapa dura con sobrecubierta de editorial ilustrada. Sin subrayados. Buen estado de conservación. ISBN: 9780691090399. N° de réf. du vendeur 041135
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Etat : New. 2003. Hardcover. Uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning. This book discusses standard game theory and combines experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is intended for students of economics and psychology. Series: The Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics. Num Pages: 568 pages, 32 line illus. 82 tables. BIC Classification: JMAL; KCA; KJC; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 249 x 167 x 38. Weight in Grams: 994. . . . . . N° de réf. du vendeur V9780691090399
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Etat : New. 2003. Hardcover. Uses psychological principles and hundreds of experiments to develop mathematical theories of reciprocity, limited strategizing, and learning. This book discusses standard game theory and combines experimental evidence and psychology in a mathematical theory of normal strategic behavior. It is intended for students of economics and psychology. Series: The Roundtable Series in Behavioral Economics. Num Pages: 568 pages, 32 line illus. 82 tables. BIC Classification: JMAL; KCA; KJC; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (U) Tertiary Education (US: College). Dimension: 249 x 167 x 38. Weight in Grams: 994. . . . . . Books ship from the US and Ireland. N° de réf. du vendeur V9780691090399
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