Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle - Couverture rigide

Biddle, Stephen

Couverture rigide

ISBN 10 : 0691116458 ISBN 13 : 9780691116457

Editeur : Princeton University Press, 2004

Synopsis

Book by Biddle Stephen

A propos du livre

Revue de presse

Stephen Biddle, a Professor at the US Army War College, has produced an important book on modern warfare. He shows how material forces, numbers and technology, only count if used in the modern system. Force deployment shapes the role of material forces. He analyses full data-sets of modern battles, proving that bigger is not always better. The increasing lethality of firepower means that since 1914 exposed mass movement is suicidal. Only the modern system of using combined arms, cover and concealment enables the attackers' forces to survive the defence's response. Biddle looks at three significant battles, firstly, the successful German attack of March 1918. For preponderance theorists, the Allies should have stopped this attack dead. The German/British force-to-force ratio was 1.5/1, among the least favourable of any major attack of the war. The British had a few more tanks, but the main weapons were still the infantry and guns of 1915-18, a defence-dominant technology. The British official history blamed the fog, as if there had been no fog until then. The Germans won an unprecedented breakthrough, advancing 40 miles across a 50-mile front. The Germans implemented the modern system tactically and to some extent operationally; the British didn't. This broke the great stalemate, not new technology, US intervention or exhaustion. Biddle's second example, Operation Goodwood in July 1944, was the failed Allied effort to break out of the Normandy beachhead. The British had more troops and weapons: 1,277 tanks, 4,500 aircraft and 118,000 troops against 319 tanks, several hundred aircraft and 29,000 troops --By William Podmore on February 21, 2005

This is an exceptional work of real empirical science. Steve Biddle has a hypothesis that "force employment" is a more important determinant of military success than either technology or preponderance of military forces. He subjects this hypothesis to a wide range of analytical and empirical tests, and the evidence in support of his argument is compelling. And the author has the foresight to raise many of the issues that occur to a skeptical reader, and to treat them with reasoned analysis and data. His prose is clear, and this is compelling reading even to one who is not an expert in this field --By Greg Davidson on November 24, 2004

Prof Terry Tucker, Senior Doctrine Developer, Saudi Arabian NG Modernization Program; The author presents a balanced, provocative and well presented case for how victory or defeat occurs in battle. This book is designed for both the tecnical numbers kind of person and also the less technical. The chapters can be read as a stand alone or you can also go through the entire book. Either way it has immense value. The thesis of this book is that force employment, or the doctrine and tactics by which forces are used in combat is centrally important. This book is great reading, is controversial in its presentation but clearly provides both empirical and quantitative analysis to support his position. THIS BOOK IS A MUST READ. --By Terry Tucker on November 12, 2005

Biographie de l'auteur

Dr. Stephen D. Biddle is a Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations. From June 2001-July of 2006, he was a Professor of National Security Studies at the U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Institute (SSI). Before joining SSI in June 2001, he was a member of the political science faculty at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He has held research positions at the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in Alexandria, Virginia; Harvard University s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (BCSIA); and the Kennedy School of Government's Office of National Security Programs. Dr. Biddle has presented testimony before congressional committees on issues relating to Operation IRAQI FREEDOM, conventional net assessment, and European arms control; served as U.S. Representative to the NATO Defense Research Group study on Stable Defense; is a member of the Defense Department Senior Advisory Group on Homeland Defense; is co-director of the Columbia University Summer Workshop on the Analysis of Military Operations and Strategy (SWAMOS); and holds an appointment as Adjunct Associate Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. His book, Military Power: Explaining Victory and Defeat in Modern Battle, was published by Princeton University Press in July 2004, and won the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Award Silver Medal for 2005. His other publications include articles in Foreign Affairs, International Security, Survival, The Journal of Politics, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, The Journal of Strategic Studies, Contemporary Security Policy, Defense Analysis, and Military Operations Research; shorter pieces on military topics in The Wall Street Journal, Orbis, Joint Force Quarterly, and Defense News; various chapters in edited volumes; and 28 IDA, SSI, and NATO reports. His research has won Barchi, Rist, and Impact Prizes from the Military Operations Research Society, and he won the Army Superior Civilian Service Medal in 2003. Dr. Biddle holds AB (1981), MPP (1985), and Ph.D. (Public Policy, 1992) degrees, all from Harvard University.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Princeton University Press
• Date d'édition: 2004
• ISBN 10: 0691116458
• ISBN 13: 9780691116457
• Reliure: Relié
• Langue: anglais
• Nombre de pages: 352