Indivisible Selves and Moral Practice - Couverture souple

Haksar, Vinit

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 0748602607 ISBN 13 : 9780748602605

Editeur : Edinburgh University Press, 1991

Synopsis

Ever since David Parfit published his "Reasons and Persons" in 1985, there has been intense debate in philosophical psychology about the status of intellectual thought-experiments - "what would we say if?". Directly countering Parfit's view that our moral life must be tailored to our speculation about the mind, the author argues in this new book that presuppositions in our moral and practical life should have a bearing on what we believe about persons and personal identity. He defends the indivisible self view, using a detailed examination of the empirical evidence arising from split-brain and multiple-personality cases. He outlines the moral, social, legal and practical implications of the different views of the self (and non-self), and deals extensively with suffering, individual persons and groups. A new contribution to the nature of the self, this book uses moral philosophy to tackle the problems of personal identity. It is aimed at advanced undergraduate and graduate students and teachers of philosophy of mind and moral philosophy, theology, psychology and law.

Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Edinburgh University Press
• Date d'édition: 1991
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 0748602607
• ISBN 13: 9780748602605
• Reliure: Broché
• Nombre de pages: 240
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: non disponible