Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees.
The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games.
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Vendeur : BuchWeltWeit Ludwig Meier e.K., Bergisch Gladbach, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. This item is printed on demand - it takes 3-4 days longer - Neuware -Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games. 260 pp. Englisch. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780792347507
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Gebunden. Etat : New. Dieser Artikel ist ein Print on Demand Artikel und wird nach Ihrer Bestellung fuer Sie gedruckt. Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theo. N° de réf. du vendeur 5968228
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Etat : New. Offers a comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. This book discusses the theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. It covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory. Series: Theory and Decision Library C. Num Pages: 254 pages, 1 black & white illustrations, biography. BIC Classification: JMH; KC; PBUD. Category: (P) Professional & Vocational; (UP) Postgraduate, Research & Scholarly. Dimension: 235 x 155 x 15. Weight in Grams: 542. . 1997. Hardback. . . . . N° de réf. du vendeur V9780792347507
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Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. Druck auf Anfrage Neuware - Printed after ordering - Coalition Formation and Social Choice provides a unified and comprehensive study of coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. It discusses the main existing theories including the size principle, conflict of interest theory, dominant player theory, policy distance theory and power excess theory. In addition, the book offers new theories of coalition formation in which the endogenous formation of preferences for coalitions is basic. Both simple game theory and social choice theory are extensively applied in the treatment of the theories. This combined application not only leads to new theories but also offers a new and fresh perspective on coalition formation and collective decision-making in committees. The book covers the fundamental concepts and results of social choice theory including Arrow's Impossibility Theorem. Furthermore, it gives a coherent treatment of the theory of simple games. Besides more traditional topics in simple game theory like power indices, it also introduces new aspects of simple games such as the Chow parameter, the Chow vector and the notion of similar games. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780792347507
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