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Of God Who Comes to Mind - Couverture souple

Levinas, Emmanuel

 
9780804730945: Of God Who Comes to Mind

Synopsis

The thirteen essays collected in this volume investigate the possibility that the word "God" can be understood now, at the end of the twentieth century, in a meaningful way. Nine of the essays appear in English translation for the first time.

Among Levinas's writings, this volume distinguishes itself, both for students of his thought and for a wider audience, by the range of issues it addresses. Levinas not only rehearses the ethical themes that have led him to be regarded as one of the most original thinkers working out of the phenomenological tradition, but he also takes up philosophical questions concerning politics, language, and religion. The volume situates his thought in a broader intellectual context than have his previous works. In these essays, alongside the detailed investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and Buber that characterize all his writings, Levinas also addresses the thought of Kierkegaard, Marx, Bloch, and Derrida.

Some essays provide lucid expositions not available elsewhere to key areas of Levinas's thought. "God and Philosophy" is perhaps the single most important text for understanding Levinas and is in many respects the best introduction to his works. "From Consciousness to Wakefulness" illuminates Levinas's relation to Husserl and thus to phenomenology, which is always his starting point, even if he never abides by the limits it imposes. In "The Thinking of Being and the Question of the Other," Levinas not only addresses Derrida's Speech and Phenomenon but also develops an answer to the later Heidegger's account of the history of Being by suggesting another way of reading that history.

Among the other topics examined in the essays are the Marxist concept of ideology, death, hermeneutics, the concept of evil, the philosophy of dialogue, the relation of language to the Other, and the acts of communication and mutual understanding.

Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.

À propos de la quatrième de couverture

“This relatively small volume of essays offers an ideal introduction to the gist of his profound and stimulating thought and illustrates how Levinas deals with life and death issues.”—The European Legacy


The thirteen essays collected in this volume investigate the possibility that the word “God” can be understood now, at the end of the twentieth century, in a meaningful way. Nine of the essays appear in English translation for the first time.
Among Levinas’s writings, this volume distinguishes itself, both for students of his thought and for a wider audience, by the range of issues it addresses. Levinas not only rehearses the ethical themes that have led him to be regarded as one of the most original thinkers working out of the phenomenological tradition, but he also takes up philosophical questions concerning politics, language, and religion. The volume situates his thought in a broader intellectual context than have his previous works. In these essays, alongside the detailed investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and Buber that characterize all his writings, Levinas also addresses the thought of Kierkegaard, Marx, Bloch, and Derrida.
Some essays provide lucid expositions not available elsewhere to key areas of Levinas’s thought. “God and Philosophy” is perhaps the single most important text for understanding Levinas and is in many respects the best introduction to his works. “From Consciousness to Wakefulness” illuminates Levinas’s relation to Husserl and thus to phenomenology, which is always his starting point, even if he never abides by the limits it imposes. In “The Thinking of Being and the Question of the Other,” Levinas not only addresses Derrida’s Speech and Phenomenon but also develops an answer to the later Heidegger’s account of the history of Being by suggesting another way of reading that history.
Among the other topics examined in the essays are the Marxist concept of ideology, death, hermeneutics, the concept of evil, the philosophy of dialogue, the relation of language to the Other, and the acts of communication and mutual understanding.

À propos de la deuxième de couverture

The thirteen essays collected in this volume investigate the possibility that the word God can be understood now, at the end of the twentieth century, in a meaningful way. Nine of the essays appear in English translation for the first time.
Among Levinass writings, this volume distinguishes itself, both for students of his thought and for a wider audience, by the range of issues it addresses. Levinas not only rehearses the ethical themes that have led him to be regarded as one of the most original thinkers working out of the phenomenological tradition, but he also takes up philosophical questions concerning politics, language, and religion. The volume situates his thought in a broader intellectual context than have his previous works. In these essays, alongside the detailed investigations of Husserl, Heidegger, Rosenzweig, and Buber that characterize all his writings, Levinas also addresses the thought of Kierkegaard, Marx, Bloch, and Derrida.
Some essays provide lucid expositions not available elsewhere to key areas of Levinass thought. God and Philosophy is perhaps the single most important text for understanding Levinas and is in many respects the best introduction to his works. From Consciousness to Wakefulness illuminates Levinass relation to Husserl and thus to phenomenology, which is always his starting point, even if he never abides by the limits it imposes. In The Thinking of Being and the Question of the Other, Levinas not only addresses Derridas Speech and Phenomenon but also develops an answer to the later Heideggers account of the history of Being by suggesting another way of reading that history.
Among the other topics examined in the essays are the Marxist concept of ideology, death, hermeneutics, the concept of evil, the philosophy of dialogue, the relation of language to the Other, and the acts of communication and mutual understanding.

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OF GOD WHO COMES TO MIND

By Emmanuel Levinas

Stanford University Press

Copyright © 1998 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All right reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-3094-5

Contents

Preface to the Second Edition....................................................ixForeword.........................................................................xiPART I: A RUPTURE OF IMMANENCE Ideology and Idealism..........................................................3 From Consciousness to Wakefulness: Starting from Husserl.......................15 On Death in the Thought of Ernst Bloch.........................................33 From the Carefree Deficiency to the New Meaning................................43PART II: THE IDEA OF GOD God and Philosophy.............................................................55 Questions and Answers..........................................................79 Hermeneutics and Beyond........................................................100 The Thinking of Being and the Question of the Other............................111 Transcendence and Evil.........................................................122PART III: THE MEANING OF BEING Dialogue: Self-Consciousness and Proximity of the Neighbor.....................137 Notes on Meaning...............................................................152 The Bad Conscience and the Inexorable..........................................172 Manner of Speaking.............................................................178Notes............................................................................183

Chapter One

PART I

A Rupture of Immanence

Ideology and Idealism

Ideology and Morality

Ideology usurps the appearances of science, but the statement of its concept ruins the credit of morality. The suspicion of ideology deals morality the hardest blow it could ever receive. This suspicion probably marks the end of an entire human ethics and, in any case, overturns the theory of duty and of values.

Understood as a set of rules for conduct founded upon the universality of maxims or upon a hierarchically ordered system of values, morality carried within itself a rationale. It had its evidence and was apprehended in an intentional act analogous to knowing. Like the categorical imperative, axiology belonged to the logos. The relativity of morality in relation to history, its variations and variants as a function of social and economic structures, did not fundamentally compromise this rationale. Both the historical situation and social particularism allowed themselves correctly to be interpreted as determining the "subjective" conditions of access to the logos and the time necessary for this access. These were the variable conditions of a clear-sightedness that did not fall omniscient from the sky and that knew periods of obscurity. The relativism that the experience of these conditions seemed to invite was attenuated to the degree to which historical evolution let itself be understood as the manifestation of reason to itself; as a progressive rationalization of the Subject up to the absolute point of a reason becoming free act, or a practical, effective reason. Utilized in the Marxist critique of bourgeois humanism, the notion of ideology received much of its persuasive force in Nietzsche and in Freud. That the appearance of rationality might be more insinuating and more resistant than a paralogism, and that its powers of mystification might be dissimulated to the point where the art of logic was insufficient for its demystification, and that the mystification might mystify the mystifiers-proceeding from an intention unconscious of itself: here lay the novelty of this notion of ideology.

It is possible, however, to think that the strange notion of suspect reason did not arise in a philosophical discourse that would simply have let itself slide into suspicions instead of producing proofs. The meaning of this reason imposes itself in the "desert that grows," in the rising moral misery of the industrial era. A meaning that signifies in the moaning or in a cry denouncing a scandal to which Reason-capable of thinking, as an economy, a world wherein one sells the "poor for a pair of sandals"-would remain insensitive without this cry. This is a prophetic cry, barely discourse; it is a voice that cries in the desert, a revolt of Marx and Marxists beyond Marxian science. It is a meaning which rends like a cry that is not reabsorbed in the system that absorbs it, and wherein it does not cease resounding in a voice other than that which carries coherent discourse. It is not always true that not-to-philosophize is still to philosophize! The interrupting force of ethics does not attest to a simple relaxing of reason, but to placing in question the act of philosophizing, which cannot fall back into philosophy. But what a singular reversal! By way of its historical relativity, by way of its normative allures, which one deems regressive, ethics is the first victim of the struggle it instigated against ideology. Ethics loses its status of reason for a precarious condition within the Ruse of reason. It passes for an unconscious effort, certainly, but also is susceptible to becoming conscious and, consequently, courageous or cowardly in view of deceiving both others and its own followers or preachers. Its rationality, one of pure semblance, is the ruse of a war of one class opposed to the other, or a refuge of frustrated beings, a bundle of illusions commanded by interests and needs for compensation.

Ideology and "Disinterestedness"

That ideology-like reason in Kant's transcendental dialectic-might be a necessary source of illusions is probably a still more recent view. If we believe Althusser, ideology always expresses the manner in which consciousness's dependency in regard to the objective or material conditions that determine it-and which scientific reason grasps in their objectivity-is experienced by this consciousness. We must at once ask ourselves if this does not teach us, at the same time, a certain eccentricity of consciousness relative to the order controlled by science-and to which science doubtlessly belongs-a dislocation of the subject, a gaping, a "game" between the subject and being.

If illusion is the modality of this game, it does not make this game, or this gap, or this exile, or this ontological "statelessness" of consciousness illusory. Could this gap be the simple effect of the incompleteness of science which, in its coming to completion, would erode to a filament the subject whose ultimate vocation should only be in service to the truth and which, once science were completed, would lose its reason for being? But it is then this indefinite deferment of scientific completion that would signify the gap between the subject and being. As this gap is found in the possibility that the subject would have of forgetting science, which, having put ideology back into its place and having certainly caused the latter to lose the pretension of being a true knowledge and of directing efficacious acts, should have brought ideology back to the rank of a psychological factor to be modified by praxis like any other factor of the real. Science will not, however, have kept this ideology, henceforth inoffensive, from continuing to assure the permanence of a subjective life that lives from its demystified illusions. This is life where under the nose of science one commits great follies, where one eats and distracts oneself, where one has ambitions and esthetic tastes, where one weeps or becomes indignant, forgetting the certainty of death and all of the physics, psychology, sociology that, behind life's back, command this life. The gap between the subject and reality, attested by ideology, would thus hold either to an always deferred completion of science or to this ever-possible forgetting of it.

But does this gap come from the subject? Does it come from a being concerned about its being and persevering in being, from an interiority clothed in an essence of a personage, from a singularity taking pleasure in its ex-ception, concerned with its happiness-or with its salvation-with its private intentions in the midst of the universality of the true? Is it the subject himself who will have dug out a hollow for ideology, between himself and being? Does this hollow not derive from a prior rupture with the illusions and the ruses that filled it; does it not derive from an interruption of essence, from a non-place, from a "utopia," from a pure interval of the epoche opened by disinterestedness? There, science would not yet have consoling dreams to be interrupted, nor megalomania to be brought back to reason; but there alone science would have found the distance necessary to its impartiality and its objectivity. Ideology would thus have been the symptom or the sign of a "non-place" where the objectivity of science eludes all impartiality. How to decide between the terms of this alternative? Perhaps another moment of the modern mind will suggest the meaning of the option to choose. And also a more complete analysis of disinterestedness.

The Uninterrupted Science

Modern epistemology is little concerned with this unconditional condition-about this necessity to tear oneself from being in order to place oneself, as a subject, upon an absolute or utopian ground, on a terrain that makes disinterestedness possible. Epistemology even mistrusts it: any distancing from reality favors ideology, in the eyes of epistemology. The conditions of rationality are henceforth all on the side of knowledge itself, and on that of the technical activity that results from it. A sort of neoscientism and neopositivism dominates Western thought. It extends to disciplines having man as their object, it extends to ideologies themselves, whose mechanisms one dismantles and whose structures one sets forth. The mathematical formalization practiced by structuralism constitutes the objectivism of the new method, which is so much its consequence. Never in the new science of man shall value serve as a principle of intelligibility. For it is precisely in value that the great Lie would take refuge: impulse or instinct, a mechanical phenomenon objectively detectable in man, gives us by its spontaneity the illusion of the subject and, by its term, the appearance of an end. The end poses as value and the impulse, consequently, garbed in practical reason, is guided by this value promoted to the rank of a universal principle. All a drama to be reduced! We must remember Spinoza, that great demolisher of ideologies, still unaware of their name-or recall his knowledge of the first genus. It is the desirable that is valued, it is not value that gives rise to desires.

In the ambiguity of the desire that still lets itself be understood, either as provoked by the value of its end or as founding value by the movement that animates it, only the second term of the alternative endures. The death of God began there. It has resulted, in our day, in the subordination of axiology to desires understood as impulses, organized according to certain formulas in those machines of desire that would be men. The new theory of knowledge no longer ascribes any transcendental role to human subjectivity. The scientific activity of the subject is interpreted as a detour by which the diverse structures to which reality is reduced show themselves and are arranged in a system. What one called, in times past, the effort of intelligence in invention would thus be only an objective event of the intelligible itself and, in some manner, a purely logical sequence. Contrary to Kantian teachings, true reason would be without interest. Structuralism is the primacy of theoretical reason.

Contemporary thought thus moves in a world of being without human traces, where subjectivity has lost its place in the midst of a spiritual landscape comparable to the one before the astronauts who first set foot on the moon, whence the earth itself appeared as a dehumanized star. Entrancing spectacles, never before seen! From the "dj vu" to the voyages yet to come! Discoveries from which one carries off pounds of stones composed of the same chemical elements as our terrestrial minerals. Perhaps they respond to the problems that up until now seemed insoluble to the specialists; perhaps they widen the horizon of specific problems. They will not tear apart the ideal line that is certainly no longer the encounter of the sky and the earth, but which marks the limit of the Same. Within the infinity of the cosmos offered up to his movements, the cosmonaut, or the space pedestrian-man-finds himself confined without being able to set foot outside.

Has science produced the beyond being in discovering the totality of being? Has it given itself the place or non-place necessary to its own birth, to maintaining its objective spirit? The question remains. The superhuman adventure of the astronauts-to refer to this adventure as if to a parable-shall certainly go at some point beyond all the knowledge that permitted it. There will then be the old biblical verses recited by Armstrong and Collins. But perhaps this ideological recitation will have expressed only the foolishness of petits bourgeois Americans, an expression inferior to their courage. And it will have expressed the infinite resources of rhetoric-that is, of rhetoric in the Platonic sense, which flatters its audience, according to the Gorgias, and which "is to justice as cookery is to medicine" (465 c); but also of a rhetoric foreshadowed in all the fullness of its ideological essence as a "spurious counterfeit of a branch of the art of government" (463 d). And already rhetoric as a power of illusion of language, according to the Phaedrus, independent of all flattery and of all interest: "not only relative to judiciary debates nor to all those of the popular Assembly ... but ... relative to all uses of the word ... we shall be capable of making anything equal to anything else" (261 de). A rhetoric that is not attached to the discourse that seeks to win a trial or a place, but a rhetoric gnawing away the very substance of the word precisely to the degree to which the latter finds itself apt to "function in the absence of all truth." Is this not already the eventuality of significations reducible to the play of signs detached from what is signified? But from then on, rhetoric becomes an ideology more desolate than any ideology, and one which no science could salvage without running the risk of sinking down into the issueless game that it would like to interrupt. An ideology crouching in the depths of the logos itself. Plato believes he can escape it by way of good rhetoric. But already he hears in discourse the simian imitation of discourse.

Yet there is also in the parable of interstellar navigation the foolishness attributed to Gagarin, declaring that he had not found God in the sky. Unless we take this seriously and hear in it a very important avowal: the new condition of existence in the weightlessness of a space "without sites" is still experienced, by the first man to be launched into space, as a here, as the same without a veritable alterity. The marvels of technology do not open the beyond where Science, their mother, was born! No outside at all in all these movements! What an immanence! What a bad infinite! That which Hegel expresses with a remarkable precision, "Something becomes an Other, but the Other is itself a Some thing, thus it becomes similarly an Other and so forth to infinity. This infinity is the bad or negative infinity inasmuch as it is nothing other than the negation of the finite which, moreover, is consequently reborn as well, as it is not suppressed."

The bad infinity proceeds from a thinking, incompletely thought, of an idea of the understanding. But the thinking that is beyond understanding is necessary to understanding itself. Is not a rupture of Essence shown objectively in the modern spirit?

The Other Man

What therefore are this movement and this life, manifested "objectively" in modern times-neither illusory ideology, nor yet Science-by which within being there occurs something like a dislocation, in the form of the subjectivity or the humanity of the subject? Does not the visible face of this ontological interruption-of this epoche-coincide with the movement "for a better society"? The modern world is no less stirred up by this-all the way to its religious depths-than by the denunciation of ideologies; although, like the miser crying "stop thief," in this movement the world is prompt to suspect itself of ideology. Is it not to return to morality to demand justice for the other man? To the very morality of morals, indisputably! Yet the invincible concern for the other man in his destitution and his homelessness-in his nakedness-in his condition or noncondition of a proletarian, this concern escapes the suspect finality of ideologies; the search for the other man who is still far away is already the relationship with this other man, a relationship in all its rectitude-a trope specific to the approach of the neighbor, which is already proximity. Here we see something coming that is other than the complacency in ideas agreeing with the particularism of a group and its interests. In the form of the relationship with the other man who, in the nakedness of his face, belongs-like a proletarian-to no fatherland, there occurs a transcendence, a departure from being and thus impartiality itself through which shall be possible, notably, science in its objectivity and humanity in the form of the I.

(Continues...)


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