How do governments choose which industries to favor? If governments are largely motivated by the national economic interest, then industrial selection would be biased in favor of picking winners. If, on the other hand, governments are motivated by an electoral and political logic, as is usually assumed in mainstream political economy approaches, then industrial choices would be skewed in favor of politically influential industries--even if they are uncompetitive or declining.
At the core of this book is a methodology that pits these competing explanations against each other, draws out their testable propositions, and then uses three different approaches--econometrics, structured data analysis, and case studies--to ascertain whether one or the other explanation prevails in the celebrated case of postwar Japan. The evidence, which ranges from Japan's earliest efforts at technology catch-up to present-day policies of indigenizing space rockets, shows that economic logic did in fact prevail across industries and over time, despite ever-present political pressures. The most important point this study uncovers is that it is not just selection but deselection that has been the hallmark of Japan's trade and industrial policies over the postwar period.
Les informations fournies dans la section « Synopsis » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Saadia M. Pekkanen is Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professor, School of International Studies; and Adjunct Professor, School of Law, at the University of Washington, Seattle
Les informations fournies dans la section « A propos du livre » peuvent faire référence à une autre édition de ce titre.
Vendeur : Revaluation Books, Exeter, Royaume-Uni
Hardcover. Etat : Brand New. 1st edition. 272 pages. 9.50x6.50x0.75 inches. In Stock. N° de réf. du vendeur x-0804747326
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Rarewaves USA, OSWEGO, IL, Etats-Unis
Hardback. Etat : New. How do governments choose which industries to favor? If governments are largely motivated by the national economic interest, then industrial selection would be biased in favor of picking winners. If, on the other hand, governments are motivated by an electoral and political logic, as is usually assumed in mainstream political economy approaches, then industrial choices would be skewed in favor of politically influential industries-even if they are uncompetitive or declining. At the core of this book is a methodology that pits these competing explanations against each other, draws out their testable propositions, and then uses three different approaches-econometrics, structured data analysis, and case studies-to ascertain whether one or the other explanation prevails in the celebrated case of postwar Japan. The evidence, which ranges from Japan's earliest efforts at technology catch-up to present-day policies of indigenizing space rockets, shows that economic logic did in fact prevail across industries and over time, despite ever-present political pressures. The most important point this study uncovers is that it is not just selection but deselection that has been the hallmark of Japan's trade and industrial policies over the postwar period. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9780804747325
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : moluna, Greven, Allemagne
Etat : New. Using case studies and econometric analyses, the author finds that the postwar Japanese state engaged in industrial policy mainly based on economic and not-as is assumed in mainstream political economy theories-political criteria.Über den Autor. N° de réf. du vendeur 595014878
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : BennettBooksLtd, Los Angeles, CA, Etats-Unis
Hardcover. Etat : New. In shrink wrap. Looks like an interesting title! N° de réf. du vendeur Q-0804747326
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : Rarewaves USA United, OSWEGO, IL, Etats-Unis
Hardback. Etat : New. How do governments choose which industries to favor? If governments are largely motivated by the national economic interest, then industrial selection would be biased in favor of picking winners. If, on the other hand, governments are motivated by an electoral and political logic, as is usually assumed in mainstream political economy approaches, then industrial choices would be skewed in favor of politically influential industries-even if they are uncompetitive or declining. At the core of this book is a methodology that pits these competing explanations against each other, draws out their testable propositions, and then uses three different approaches-econometrics, structured data analysis, and case studies-to ascertain whether one or the other explanation prevails in the celebrated case of postwar Japan. The evidence, which ranges from Japan's earliest efforts at technology catch-up to present-day policies of indigenizing space rockets, shows that economic logic did in fact prevail across industries and over time, despite ever-present political pressures. The most important point this study uncovers is that it is not just selection but deselection that has been the hallmark of Japan's trade and industrial policies over the postwar period. N° de réf. du vendeur LU-9780804747325
Quantité disponible : Plus de 20 disponibles
Vendeur : Buchpark, Trebbin, Allemagne
Etat : Sehr gut. Zustand: Sehr gut | Seiten: 304 | Sprache: Englisch | Produktart: Bücher | How do governments choose which industries to favor? If governments are largely motivated by the national economic interest, then industrial selection would be biased in favor of picking winners. If, on the other hand, governments are motivated by an electoral and political logic, as is usually assumed in mainstream political economy approaches, then industrial choices would be skewed in favor of politically influential industries--even if they are uncompetitive or declining. >. N° de réf. du vendeur 1204624/2
Quantité disponible : 1 disponible(s)
Vendeur : AHA-BUCH GmbH, Einbeck, Allemagne
Buch. Etat : Neu. Neuware - How do governments choose which industries to favor If governments are largely motivated by the national economic interest, then industrial selection would be biased in favor of picking winners. If, on the other hand, governments are motivated by an electoral and political logic, as is usually assumed in mainstream political economy approaches, then industrial choices would be skewed in favor of politically influential industries--even if they are uncompetitive or declining. >. N° de réf. du vendeur 9780804747325
Quantité disponible : 2 disponible(s)