Debating Arab Authoritarianism: Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes - Couverture souple

Couverture souple

ISBN 10 : 080476333X ISBN 13 : 9780804763332

Editeur : Stanford University Press, 2008

Synopsis

This volume inquires into the working mechanisms, the inner logic, and the durability of authoritarian rule in Arab countries. Written by leading American, European, and Arab experts, the collected essays explore the ongoing political dynamics of the region and show how Arab regimes retain power despite ongoing transformations on regional, national, and international levels and in societal, political, and economic spheres.

The findings of this book strongly suggest that democratization remains off the agenda in any Arab country for the foreseeable future. Domestic political protests, international pressure toward more liberal governance, and "reform-oriented" regimes notwithstanding, Debating Arab Authoritarianism indicates that while the impetus for political change is strong, it is in the direction of an adaptation to changed circumstances and may even be a revitalization or consolidation of authoritarian rule rather than a systemic transition to democracy.

A propos du livre

À propos des auteurs

Oliver Schlumberger is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn, Germany. His research focuses on Middle East politics and political economy as well as on nondemocratic regimes and democracy promotion.

Oliver Schlumberger is a Senior Researcher at the German Development Institute (DIE), Bonn, Germany. His research focuses on Middle East politics and political economy as well as on nondemocratic regimes and democracy promotion.

Extrait. © Reproduit sur autorisation. Tous droits réservés.

Debating Arab Authoritarianism

Dynamics and Durability in Nondemocratic Regimes

By Oliver Schlumberger

STANFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

Copyright © 2007 Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University
All rights reserved.

ISBN: 978-0-8047-6333-2

Contents

Title Page, 
Copyright Page, 
Dedication, 
Acknowledgments, 
Contributors, 
1 - Arab Authoritarianism, 
Part 1 - STATE-SOCIETY RELATIONS AND POLITICAL OPPOSITION, 
2 - Social Pacts and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Middle East, 
3 - The Management of Opposition, 
4 - Authoritarian Opposition and the Politics of Challenge in Egypt, 
5 - Islamist Inclusion and Regime Persistence, 
Part 2 - THE REGIMES, 
6 - The Ozymandias Syndrome, 
7 - Intraregime Dynamics, Uncertainty, and the Persistence of Authoritarianism in the Contemporary Arab World, 
8 - Privatization of Social Services as a Regime Strategy, 
9 - State Building, Liberalization From Above, and Political Legitimacy in the Sultanate of Oman, 
Part 3 - THE ECONOMY AND THE POLITY, 
10 - Linking Economic and Political Reform in the Middle East, 
11 - The Political Economy of Regime Maintenance in Egypt, 
12 - From Political To Economic Actors, 
Part 4 - THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA, 
13 - International Dimensions of Middle Eastern Authoritarianism, 
14 - Democracy Promotion and the Renewal of Authoritarian Rule, 
15 - The Longevity of the House of Saud, 
Reference Matter, 
Notes, 
Bibliography, 
Index, 

CHAPTER 1

ARAB AUTHORITARIANISM

Debating the Dynamics and Durability of Nondemocratic Regimes

Oliver Schlumberger

AUTHORITARIAN RULE still prevails in the Arab countries. What are the working mechanisms and inner logic that contribute to its durability? Rather than asking, as Salamé (1991) did, "Why ... is the Arab world not democratic?" the contributors to this volume examine how authoritarianism works in practice and how it can be grasped conceptually. These questions are especially pertinent with respect to the Arab world because it is the only world region that has not, over the past three to four decades, experienced any cases of "transition from authoritarian rule" (O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986) and because, arguably, many of the possible answers to Salamé's question will be affected by how we assess current political rule in the Middle East.

Under the heading of Arab exceptionalism the puzzle set out by Salamé has preoccupied scholars for the past two decades and — with the possible exception of the Arab-Israeli conflict(s) — may well be the single most important long-term issue in Middle Eastern politics since the end of the Cold War. The mode of governance in the Arab world is of prime importance in the post-9 /11 world because of its direct relevance to international peace and security and to the relations of Western governments with their Arab counterparts. It is also relevant because of the region's paramount importance for the global economy (world energy markets) and because of the area's geopolitical location at the crossroads of three continents, rendering its constituent states close yet politically "distant neighbors" (Ayubi 1995a).

This debate on political rule in the Arab world has been characterized by widespread disagreement among scholars who hold divergent views, assess events differently from one another, and come from different schools of thought. However, one broad consensus has emerged: The Middle East finds itself amid significant political change in the 2000s. Against a background where violent conflict once again looms large, this intersection of different possible political trajectories comes at a time when political dynamics and change in most Arab countries have gained a degree of momentum in ways not seen in the recent past. The political choices made by leaders of the region and by external players and rapidly changing social, economic, and international contexts all contribute to a new dynamic. This dynamic has certainly been accelerated in the post-9/11 era, as the eyes of the world have focused more intensely on the region than before; however, what is now taking place in the region originated long before September 11, 2001.

WINDS OF CHANGE ...?

Three phenomena that have long been absent from the Middle Eastern scene have reappeared and seem to signal that strong winds of change are blowing throughout the Arab world: political protest, political reform, and more visible pressure for political reform exerted by external players. Together, these phenomena are giving rise to renewed expectations among both policymakers and scholars of thoroughgoing political reforms, including the transition of Arab polities to more participatory systems of governance.

First, political protesters and, in some cases, antigovernment or even antiregime opposition took to the streets in numerous countries in the region. In Lebanon mass demonstrations against the long-standing Syrian occupation were largely responsible for Syria withdrawing its troops in 2005. In Bahrain human rights activists, and women's rights activists in particular, gained considerable ground despite repressive moves by the regime. Women also advanced in Kuwait, where they now have the vote for the first time. Moreover, a majority of deputies walked out of the Kuwaiti parliament in 2006 in protest against the government's reluctance to reduce the number of constituencies, which would make electoral competition more fair. In the Egyptian capital people took to the streets and said "enough" to a quarter-century of President Mubarak's rule. The Kifaya movement openly challenged the legitimacy of the rule of Egypt's modern pharaoh. Regionwide civil society declarations and statements, such as those of Alexandria or Beirut (both in 2004), bear witness to the fact that for the first time in decades public protests have adopted a decidedly political tone. Rather than exploding into bread riots as a result of rising unemployment and increased poverty, the almost proverbial "Arab street" seems to have reemerged, albeit with fewer numbers, in a highly politicized fashion after having been silenced since the 1950s and 1960s, the last time the masses were mobilized during the heyday of Arab nationalism.

Second, at the same time as the emergence of new political movements from below, incumbent regimes themselves, long hesitant about the idea of political change, seem to have grasped the necessity of political reform. Numerous declarations on good governance, greater pluralism, human rights, and democratic reforms have emanated from within the region (e.g., Tunis in 2004, Sana'a in 2004, and the Dead Sea in 2005). What is more, these initiatives "from above" have been accompanied by actual reforms. Thus from the new personal status code in Morocco to Saudi Arabia's first ever local elections, from the installation of parliaments in Gulf countries such as Oman to the opening of the Egyptian presidential elections to competition, from decentralization schemes in Yemen or Jordan to discussions about the abolition of the Ba'ath Party's hegemonic position in Damascus, from new Jordanian laws against corruption to the gradual opening of Libya, Middle Eastern rulers have started to vie for international attention for engaging in political reform, and most of them have done so in more than one area of governance.

Third, the domestic political dynamic from above and below has been accompanied by a new emphasis on the promotion of good governance by external players. While Kant (1995 [1795]) would not have dreamt that a dozen Islamist terrorists would one day help his theorem of "perpetual peace" to become popular among American neoconservatives, George W. Bush's administration in particular promised to abandon the former US strategy of supporting dictators, because this had produced only the illusion of stability. Only free countries, runs the recent discourse, would guarantee long-term peace and security. Hence promoting democracy probably figured more prominently in US and other Western countries' policies toward the Middle East than ever before, at least rhetorically. In 2002 the United States launched a Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), and other Western countries followed suit with their own bilateral initiatives for political reform. Yet not only did authoritarianism come to be seen as a threat to international security, but in a parallel discourse it was also identified as a major obstacle to sustainable human and economic development (Sen 1999). Therefore international organizations and multilateral donors, such as the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, in 2004), the Group of Eight (G8, in 2004), the World Bank (in 2003), and the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, in 2000), embarked on programs that promoted better governance and reforms in the direction of political openness in the Middle East.

Although this flurry of external initiatives and pressures for political reform leave the observer with the impression of a degree of concerted action by the international community hardly paralleled elsewhere, strivings for political change, including democracy promotion (direct intervention aside), have a history that goes back at least several decades. Even before the 2003 war on Iraq, more than 800 bi- and multilateral programs and projects had been implemented in the Middle East under the heading of democracy promotion (cf. Carapico 2002).

Hence pressures for political change or liberalization can be depicted neither as Western reaction to the events of 9/11 nor as a direct consequence of the military intervention by US and allied forces in Iraq. External support for improving governance has no doubt been intensified in the recent past, but processes of political liberalization have a longer history in the region (cf., e.g., Brynen et al. 1995, 1998).Prominent contemporary political dynamics, whether originating within the region or exported to it, are embedded in wider processes of political, social, and economic change that the Arab world has been undergoing in recent history. Thus they should be interpreted as part of a series of processes that set in before both the war on Iraq and recent international initiatives.

Even a casual look at the literature validates this claim. For most of the 1990s both Arab and international scholars tended to assume, in light of political liberalization, that the famous "third wave" (Huntington 1991) of democratization had already begun to reach the shores of the Arab world. In an optimistic turn and with understandable if somewhat premature enthusiasm, regional experts declared that "the Arab world is evolving along the same broad trends and processes that have been at work elsewhere in newly democratizing societies" (Ibrahim 1994, 27). Comparativists joined in and wrote of Arab countries as "emergent democracies" (Schmitter 2001, 104). Schmitter, in fact, answered his own question of whether it was "safe for transitologists to travel to the Middle East and North Africa" by asserting explicitly that political dynamics in Arab countries should be interpreted according to the "democratization paradigm" that has recently gained renewed popularity in policy circles.

... OR DUST OF CONTINUITY?

All the dynamics described so far and the corresponding optimist literature of the 1990s, however, stand in sharp contrast to the empirical reality of what is now routinely addressed as the Arab world's "democracy deficit" or "governance gap" (Richards 2005; UNDP 2002, 2005; World Bank 2003). The startling fact is that in the Middle East none of the mentioned initiatives and dynamics have produced a structurally enhanced quality of governance (in the sense of guaranteed basic freedoms that Arab citizens enjoy), let alone any instances of democratization. In this respect the world's most unfree region is indeed unique.

A case in point is Egypt. When the country was under close US scrutiny during the national and presidential elections in 2005, the regime used a strategy of making minimum gestures toward political reform. A constitutional amendment allowed alternative candidates to run for the presidency — without, however, opening up the system for meaningful political contestation. Although Freedom House (2006) rated Egypt less repressive in 2005 than in 2004, early 2006 saw the regime brutally cracking down on the newly organized opposition forces, including hundreds of arrests and massive human rights violations not only against protesters in the streets but also against the country's independent-minded judges. Despite discussions, the state of emergency was once again not lifted, and chances to strengthen the rule of law were thus further deferred. Simultaneously, external pressure for political reform was reduced in 2006, most notably through the US administration's "giving up on the 'liberty doctrine'" (Hamzawy and McFaul 2006). In short, the regime left no doubt of its determination to cling to power as firmly as in the past. Recent events thus confirm a pattern of showcase reforms that are most often neutralized by the effects of deliberalizing measures taken simultaneously or shortly afterward. This pattern is well known: Even though the regime might appear "in the guise of democracy" (Kassem 1999), this is "a grand delusion" (Kienle 2001), geared toward greater external legitimacy rather than at allowing political contestation at home.

To be sure, this is just a snapshot that could be taken in nearly every Arab country from Morocco to Oman. The crux is that the centers of political power in all Arab countries have remained firmly closed off from contestation — one of the two necessary attributes of democracy according to Dahl's seminal study (1971).Obviously, democracy is not high on any Arab regime's agenda. And while in comparative politics the "concepts, hypotheses and assumptions" that Schmitter (2001) mentions (see note 2) became almost paradigmatic in a Kuhnian sense (Kuhn 1962) during the 1990s, Thomas Carothers (2002) declared "the end" of this very paradigm.

As the 1990s came to a close, many scholars realized that political liberalization in the Arab world is easily reversible and has in fact often been followed by "deliberalization" (Kienle 1998c). A growing number of area specialists thus joined in Heydemann's (2002, 62) call for Middle Eastern studies to enter a "post-democratization era" (cf. also Schlumberger 2000a). With the transitologist approach having hardly furthered the understanding of Middle Eastern political dynamics, scholars increasingly asserted that Arab regimes are "liberalized autocracies" (Brumberg 2002), "yet they persist" (Brownlee 2002a). Consequently, a more recent strand of literature turned the Salamé puzzle (why no democracy) on its head. Arguably, this more recent literature might be motivated primarily by a certain pessimism, at times even exhibiting overtones of frustration. This time, the question was, Why is authoritarianism so exceptionally "successful" in that region? (cf., e.g., Bellin 2004; Posusney and Penner Angrist 2005). Yet the frequency of pejorative terms such as "gap," "deficit," and the like, even in the more recent literature, reveals that one thing has by and large remained constant: the popularity of an implicit frame of reference that analyzes Middle Eastern politics against the normative background of how "the free world" would like to see Arab countries ruled. Apparently, the predominance of the "democratization paradigm" is particularly hard to break and continues to preoccupy many analyses of Middle Eastern politics.

INTERPRETING THE DYNAMICS OF AUTHORITARIANISM BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIZATION PARADIGM

The contributors to this book attempt to push the debate further by transcending the optimist-pessimist divide of these two strands of literature. They do not ask when democratization might ultimately occur or what the Middle East "lacks." Rather, the research interest here is on how political rule in Arab countries is effectuated, organized, and executed.

The two key questions guiding the following chapters pertain to the title of the present collection, namely, the durability of Arab regimes on the one hand and the political dynamics within the Arab world on the other. In brief, the two questions could thus be captured as (1) what accounts for the durability of nondemocratic rule in Arab countries? and (2) what are the dynamics that characterize political developments in Arab polities and how can they be grasped analytically?

Both questions interrelate in many instances and in a variety of different ways. The contributors struggle to find explanations that can grasp underlying political dynamics beyond the rather narrow focus of (reversible) political liberalization and deliberalization processes. They focus on elements that they consider central to an understanding of the working mechanisms and functional logic of nondemocracies as they prevail in the Arab world. The aim is thus neither to detect signs (however faint) of democratization or its antecedents nor, vice versa, to prove the authoritarian nature of political rule in the Arab countries. Rather, the contributions explore how Arab regimes manage to remain in power despite grand transformation on all three levels (national, regional, and international) and in the societal, political, and economic sphere while at the same time looking at how such changes shape political dynamics.

Framing the Research: Understanding Arab Authoritarianism Through Multiple Lenses

This book is distinctive in several respects, some of which are linked to the perspective its contributors share on the question of how to interpret political dynamics in the Arab world. The contributors agree about the state of affairs insofar as they view current forms of political rule in Arab countries as unmistakably authoritarian. Thus, in examining ongoing political dynamics, we do not speak of processes of democratic transition.

(Continues...)

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Détails de l'édition

• Éditeur: Stanford University Press
• Date d'édition: 2008
• Langue: anglais
• ISBN 10: 080476333X
• ISBN 13: 9780804763332
• Reliure: Broché
• Nombre de pages: 345
• Éditeur: Schlumberger Oliver
• Coordonnées du fabricant: non disponible
• Personne responsable: Mare Nostrum Group B.V.; gpsr@mare-nostrum.co.uk; ; Doelen 72; Breda; 4831 GR; Pays-Bas