Articles liés à Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age

Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age - Couverture souple

Payne, Keith

 
9780813108957: Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age

Synopsis

Keith Payne begins by asking, "Did we really learn how to deter predictably and reliably during the Cold War?" He answers cautiously in the negative, pointing out that we know only that our policies toward the Soviet Union did not fail. What we can be more certain of, in Payne's view, is that such policies will almost assuredly fail in the Second Nuclear Age—a period in which direct nuclear threat between superpowers has been replaced by threats posed by regional "rogue" powers newly armed with chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The fundamental problem with deterrence theory is that is posits a rational—hence predictable—opponent. History frequently demonstrates the opposite. Payne argues that as the one remaining superpower, the United States needs to be more flexible in its approach to regional powers.

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À propos des auteurs

Keith B. Payne, president of the National Institute for Public Policy, adjunct professor at Georgetown University, editor-in-chief of Comparative Strategy, and a member of the State Department's Defense Trade Advisory Group, is the author of seven previous books on international security issues.

Colin S. Gray, professor of international politics and strategic studies at the University of Reading, England, and senior fellow at the National Institute for Public Policy, is the uthor of numerous books, including Modern Strategy and Strategy for Chaos: Revolutions in Military Affairs and the Evidence of History. He lives in Berkshire, England.

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